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Abstract
In August 2016, the Bank of England (BoE) announced a Corporate Bond Purchase
Scheme (CBPS) to purchase up to £10bn of sterling corporate bonds. To investigate
the impact of these purchases on liquidity, we create a novel dataset that combines
transaction-level data from the secondary corporate bond market with proprietary
offer-level data from the BoE’s CBPS auctions. Identifying the impact of central
bank asset purchases on liquidity is potentially impacted by reverse causality, be-
cause liquidity considerations might impact purchases. But the offer-level data allow
us to construct proxy measures for the BoE’s demand for bonds and auction par-
ticipants’ supply of bonds, meaning that we can control for the impact of liquidity
on purchases. Across a range of liquidity measures, we find that CBPS purchases
improved the liquidity of purchased bonds.
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1 Introduction
Quantitative easing (QE) has become a key component of the monetary policy toolkit
since the global financial crisis. The aim of QE is typically to stimulate nominal spending
and therefore increase inflation (Joyce et al., 2011b). But the introduction of a large,
relatively price-insensitive buyer has the potential to significantly impact market func-
tioning. Indeed, both policy makers and market participants have raised concerns that
central bank asset purchases could lead to a deterioration in market liquidity. For exam-
ple, in his 2012 Jackson Hole speech, Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke argued that
the Federal Reserve’s large-scale asset purchases “could impair the functioning of secu-
rities markets” (Bernanke, 2012). Similarly, fund manager PIMCO reported that “the
Street’s capacity or willingness to provide liquidity has declined” after the ECB began
its covered bond purchase programme in 2014 (Financial Times, 2015). Poor liquidity
can increase financial stability risks, impede price discovery and lead to misallocation of
resources. Understanding the impact of QE on liquidity is therefore of clear importance
to the design of future policy interventions.
In theory, the impact of central bank asset purchases on liquidity could be positive or
negative. On the one hand, asset purchases are likely to stimulate trading by inducing
portfolio rebalancing. In addition, market participants have argued that the presence of a
‘back-stop buyer’ makes dealers more willing to hold larger bond inventories, and therefore
facilitates market-making. On the other hand, asset purchases lead to a reduction in the
quantity of bonds held by private investors, which could damage liquidity by increasing
search frictions. Moreover, asset purchases by a relatively price-insensitive central bank
might distort price signals, reducing the willingness of market participants to trade. The
net effect of these channels is theoretically ambiguous and is likely to depend on the
structure of the market and the design of the asset purchase programme.
This paper contributes to our understanding of these issues by providing evidence on
the impact of the Bank of England’s (BoE) Corporate Bond Purchase Scheme (CBPS)
on the liquidity of sterling corporate bonds. In August 2016, following the UK’s vote to
leave the European Union, the BoE announced a package of monetary stimulus measures.
This included a new scheme to purchase up to £10bn of sterling-denominated corporate
bonds. The purchases were implemented between September 2016 and April 2017 via a
series of auctions. The objective of the purchases was to impart monetary stimulus by
lowering corporate bond yields, triggering portfolio rebalancing, and stimulating corporate
bond issuance (Bank of England, 2016). But a potential unintended consequence was a
reduction in market liquidity. This paper focuses on the impact of the CBPS on liquidity,
rather than the overall macroeconomic impact.
Our analysis of the CBPS is based on a novel combination of two granular, propri-
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etary datasets: transaction-level data on the corporate bond market and offer-level data
from the CBPS auctions. We use the transaction-level data to compute a wide range of
measures of market liquidity, including simple measures of trading activity such as total
weekly trading volume, measures of transaction costs such as the effective spread, and
measures of price impact such as the Amihud measure. We then use the offer-level data
to estimate the impact of CBPS purchases on these liquidity measures.
In general, an important challenge to identifying the causal impact of central bank
asset purchases on liquidity is that purchases are not randomly assigned across bonds.
Instead, the purchase decisions of the central bank might be affected by liquidity consid-
erations. For example, the central bank might focus purchases on less liquid bonds in an
attempt to improve the liquidity of those bonds. Alternatively, the central bank might
avoid purchasing illiquid bonds in order to reduce the risk on its own balance sheet. In
either case, there would be a problem of reverse causality, with liquidity impacting pur-
chases rather than purchases impacting liquidity. Importantly, this effect could go in
either direction.
The design of the CBPS and the granularity of our dataset help us to reduce the mag-
nitude of any estimation biases arising from reverse causality. In comparison to bilateral
purchases, the auction design of the CBPS greatly reduces the discretionary nature of
purchases. During the auctions, the auction participants submitted offers specifying the
bonds that they were willing to sell to the BoE and the spreads (prices) at which they were
willing to sell them. The offers can be viewed as expressions of the auction participants’
supply of bonds. And ahead of each auction, the BoE set a reserve spread for each bond,
i.e. a spread below which any offers would be rejected. The reserve spreads were based
on risk management considerations and the BoE’s various purchase targets and limits.
The reserve spreads can be viewed as expressions of the BoE’s demand for each bond.
The CBPS purchases were then determined by the intersection of the BoE’s demand and
the auction participants’ supply. Both of these might have been impacted by liquidity
considerations. But the granularity of our offer-level dataset allows us to construct proxies
for both the BoE’s demand (using the reserve spreads) and auction participants’ supply
(based on their offers). These demand and supply proxies control for the potential impact
of liquidity on purchases, and therefore reduce the magnitude of any reverse causality.
We begin by estimating the impact of the CBPS purchases on contemporaneous liq-
uidity - that is, liquidity in the week following the auction. In our baseline regressions, our
identification strategy is to estimate the impact of asset purchases on secondary market
liquidity using a difference-in-differences approach, controlling for both the BoE’s demand
and auction participants’ supply of eligible bonds. The treatment group is bonds that
were purchased, and the control group is bonds that received offers in the auction but
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were not purchased (either because the offer spreads were below the BoE’s reserve spreads
or because binding purchase limits were hit).
We find that the CBPS purchases significantly improved the contemporaneous liquid-
ity of purchased bonds relative to the control group, across a range of liquidity measures.
For example, over the week following an auction, a typical purchase size of £5mn was
associated with an increase in average trade size of around £0.57mn (compared to an av-
erage level of £0.81mn over the sample period), a reduction in the effective bid-ask spread
of around 4.3 basis points (compared to an average of 26 basis points), and a reduction
in the volatility associated with a £1mn trade of around 3.4 basis points (compared to
an average of 26 basis points). These results appear consistent with a scenario in which
the purchases provided dealers with confidence that they could sell bonds to the BoE if
needed, and thereby increased dealers’ willingness to intermediate trades. This is con-
sistent with reports from participants in the sterling corporate bond market during the
CBPS (Belsham et al., 2017; Financial News, 2017).
It is plausible that the impact on liquidity of the treated bonds spilled over to the
control bonds due to investor portfolio rebalancing. In that case, the estimates above
would be underestimates of the true effect. In order to obtain estimates that are less likely
to be impacted by spillover effects, we repeat the analysis using two additional control
groups that are less similar to the treatment group: sterling-denominated investment
grade corporate bonds that were not eligible for the CBPS, and euro-denominated bonds
issued by issuers who also issued eligible bonds. Using these additional control groups has
the advantage that the results are less likely to be impacted by spillover effects; but the
disadvantage that we are unable to control for demand and supply (because the bonds in
these control groups were not eligible in the auctions). The results using these additional
control groups are similar to the results using the benchmark control group.
The results above suggest that, in this case, the potential negative impact of QE on
liquidity did not dominate. On the contrary, CBPS purchases had a significant positive
impact on the liquidity of purchased bonds. This impact on liquidity does not appear to
persist beyond one week: we find little evidence of any association between liquidity and
lagged purchases. Similarly, when we compare the overall change in liquidity of bonds be-
tween the start and end of the scheme, we find no evidence that the liquidity of purchased
bonds changed systematically relative to sterling bonds that were not purchased.
Related literature
Most studies of the financial market impact of QE have focussed on government bond
markets: for example, D’Amico and King (2013); Breedon et al. (2012); Joyce and Tong
(2012); Joyce et al. (2011a); McLaren et al. (2014); Gagnon et al. (2011).
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Several studies have estimated the impact of central bank asset purchases on secondary
market liquidity. The direction of the estimated effect varies across papers. Investigating
asset purchase programmes in the euro area and UK, Beirne et al. (2011), Eser and
Schwaab (2011), De Pooter et al. (2018) and Steeley (2015) find evidence that asset
purchases improved liquidity. On the other hand, Kandrac (2013), Kandrac (2018), Han
and Seneviratne (2018) and Kurosaki et al. (2015) find that asset purchase programmes
in the US and Japan damaged liquidity. Some papers find mixed evidence within a single
purchase programme. Christensen and Gillan (2017), Schlepper et al. (Forthcoming),
Pelizzon et al. (2018), Iwatsubo and Taishi (2016) and Abidi and Miquel-Flores (2018)
find that the direction of the effect varies over time or across liquidity measures. The
mixed results across studies might reflect differences in the operational design of the
asset purchase programmes, as well as the nature of the markets in which they were
implemented. Indeed, Ferdinandusse et al. (2017) model the relationship between QE
and liquidity theoretically and find that it is ambiguous.
An important challenge faced by the existing papers on this topic is reverse causality.
If central bank purchase decisions reflect liquidity considerations, then existing estimates
of the impact of QE on liquidity are likely to be biased. Indeed, Song and Zhu (2014) and
Schlepper et al. (Forthcoming) both find evidence that purchase decisions are impacted
by liquidity. Our key contribution relative to the existing empirical literature is to use
granular offer-level data to control for the demand and supply factors that determine
the purchases. This should reduce the magnitude of any reverse causality and therefore
better identify the causal impact of the purchases on liquidity. To our knowledge, the only
existing paper to use offer-level data to estimate the impact of QE auctions is Song and
Zhu (2014), which studies the Federal Reserve’s purchases of Treasury bonds. However,
due to data constraints, that study only uses data on accepted offers. In contrast, we use
data on all offers by CBPS auction participants (both rejected and accepted). This allows
us to control for dealers’ supply using information from the complete supply curve.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes how the CBPS
was implemented and discusses the channels through which it might have impacted liquid-
ity. Section 3 describes the auction data and the data on secondary market transactions
in the corporate bond market, and explains how we measure liquidity in that market.
Section 4 investigates whether the initial announcement of the CBPS had an immedi-
ate impact on liquidity. Section 5 describes our approach to addressing reverse causality
and reports our results regarding the effects of the CBPS on contemporaneous liquidity.
Section 6 considers whether the purchases had any longer-term impacts on liquidity, and
Section 7 concludes.
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2 The Corporate Bond Purchase Scheme
2.1 Background to the CBPS
On 4 August 2016, following the UK’s vote to leave the European Union, the Bank of
England (BoE) announced a package of monetary stimulus measures. This included a
reduction in Bank Rate, a new Term Funding Scheme, and an expansion of the BoE’s
programme of quantitative easing. The expansion of QE included both an increase in
government bond purchases and a new Corporate Bond Purchase Scheme (CBPS).
The CBPS was authorised to purchase up to £10 billion of sterling-denominated in-
vestment grade corporate bonds over a period of 18 months. The purpose of the CBPS
was “to impart monetary stimulus by lowering the yields on corporate bonds, thereby
reducing the cost of borrowing for companies directly; by triggering portfolio rebalancing;
and by stimulating new issuance of corporate bonds” (Bank of England, 2016, page vii).
Impacting secondary market liquidity was not an explicit aim of the scheme.1
In order to be eligible for purchase, bonds had to be denominated in sterling, rated
investment grade, and issued by firms that made “a material contribution to economic
activity in the UK” (Bank of England, 2017). Bonds issued by banks, building societies,
insurance companies and other financial sector entities regulated by the BoE or the UK
Financial Conduct Authority were ineligible. More detailed eligibility criteria are provided
in Bank of England (2017). A list of eligible bonds was first published on 12 September
2016, and this was updated regularly while purchases were ongoing.
Purchases began on 27 September 2016 and were conducted via auctions (discussed
further below). The BoE announced that it had reached the £10bn target on 27 April
2017, at which point purchases ceased. During this seven-month period, the BoE pur-
chased bonds at an average pace of £357mn per week. At the end of the purchase period,
the BoE’s holdings amounted to around 6% of eligible bonds, by market value. Since the
completion of purchases, the BoE has continued to hold the stock of bonds. In August
2017, the BoE’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) agreed that the BoE would rein-
vest cash flows from maturing bonds held under the CBPS back into eligible corporate
bonds, with the first reinvestment operation expected to take place in 2019 H2. Further
description of the CBPS and the composition of purchases is provided in Belsham et al.
(2017).
1The BoE also purchased sterling corporate bonds in 2009, with the aim of improving market func-
tioning during the intense financial market stress at the time (Fisher, 2010). The 2009 purchases were of
a much smaller scale, with peak holdings of less than £2bn.
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2.2 The CBPS auction mechanism
Purchases of corporate bonds were implemented via a series of multi-good reverse auctions.
Each eligible bond was assigned to one of nine sectors based on the industrial sector of its
issuer. There were three auctions per week, with each auction on a different day. Different
sectors were included in different auctions so that each eligible bond was auctioned once
per week. The design of the auctions took into account the relatively illiquid nature of
the sterling corporate bond market (Salmon, 2017).
The auction participants were fourteen of the major dealers (market-makers) in the
sterling corporate bond market. Dealers submitted offers to sell bonds to the BoE, and
were able to submit multiple offers per bond. An offer consisted of a quantity and a price
(expressed as a yield spread to the benchmark gilt for that bond), implying that the dealer
was willing to sell the offer quantity at a spread less than or equal to the offer spread.
Before each auction, the BoE set a minimum spread (maximum price) for each bond,
i.e. a reserve spread. Any offers below the reserve spread would be rejected. The reserve
spread was unobserved by auction participants and reflected several factors. First, the
BoE sought to purchase a portfolio of bonds that matched the proportion of total out-
standing eligible bonds accounted for by different sectors (the ‘sector key’). So if a sector
was over-represented in the CBPS portfolio relative to the amount in issue, the reserve
spreads for bonds in that sector would be increased in order to make offers against bonds
in that sector relatively less attractive, and therefore slow down purchases. Similarly,
if a sector was under-represented relative to the sector key, the BoE would reduce the
reserve spreads for that sector to increase purchases. Second, the reserve spread reflected
bond-level, issuer-level and sector-level purchase limits: if the BoE was close to reaching
the purchase limits for a bond, it would increase the reserve spread for that bond to re-
duce the pace of future purchases. Third, the reserve spread reflected market-based and
model-based indicators of the risk characteristics of the bond. The BoE reserved the right
to adjust the reserve spread on the basis of any other information.
In addition to the sector targets and overall purchase limits, there were also purchase
limits within an auction. The BoE would not purchase more than £10mn of a single bond
in a single auction. And the total amount that the BoE would purchase in a given auction
was determined on the basis of the quantity and quality of offers received.
The purchases were then determined according to the interaction of the offers, reserve
spreads and purchase limits. Offers were ranked in order of attractiveness, taking into
account the difference between the offer spread and the reserve spread. Offers would
then be accepted in order of attractiveness until the auction purchase target was reached.
Offers were allocated on a uniform spread basis, meaning that all successful offers for a
bond were allocated at the same spread, with offers at the clearing spread pro-rated if
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necessary. Further detail on the auction process is available in Bank of England (2017).
While the main features of the auction process were published, auction participants
were able to observe only limited information about the auction outcomes (beyond the
outcomes of their own offers). The BoE published weekly data on total corporate bond
holdings, with a one-week lag, and a monthly update of sector allocations relative to the
sector key. But auction participants were unable to observe reserve spreads, holdings of
individual bonds, or purchase limits. Therefore, from the perspective of participants, there
was significant uncertainty regarding which of their offers would be accepted and rejected.
A participant might submit offers for two different bonds that, from the perspective of
the participant, are equally aggressive; but discover that one is accepted and the other is
rejected on the basis of unobserved reserve spreads or purchase limits.
The auction mechanism used for the CBPS is in contrast to the manner in which
many other central bank asset purchase programmes have been carried out.2 For ex-
ample, very few of the asset purchases by the Eurosystem have been implemented via
auction. Instead, these programmes have typically been implemented via bilateral pur-
chases in the primary and/or secondary markets. As explained in Section 5.1, the auction
setting provides important advantages for identifying the causal impact of the CBPS on
liquidity. This is because it enables us to observe (and therefore control for) the determi-
nants of purchases with much greater granularity, thereby reducing concerns around the
endogeneity of purchases.
2.3 The impact of the CBPS on yields, issuance and trading
The spreads of sterling-denominated investment grade corporate bonds fell sharply when
the CBPS was announced (Figure 1), indicating that the policy came as a surprise to
market participants. By comparing the spreads of eligible sterling bonds to the spreads of
dollar and euro bonds issued by the same set of firms, Boneva et al. (2018) estimate that
the announcement of the CBPS caused a reduction in eligible bond spreads of at least
13 basis points. Moreover, analysing the price reaction by bond characteristics, D’Amico
and Kaminska (2019) show that the main channels through which market participants
believed that the CBPS would affect corporate bond prices were likely to be linked to
changes in net supply, rather than confidence or credit risk.
The CBPS appeared to have a significant impact on financing conditions. Gross is-
suance of sterling non-financial corporate bonds had been falling for several years prior to
the introduction of the CBPS, which market participants ascribed to structural develop-
ments relating to the investor base (Elliott and Middeldorp, 2016). But sterling issuance
increased substantially following the announcement of the CBPS (Figure 2). Market par-
2The BoE also uses auctions for its government bond QE purchases.
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ticipants argued that the reduction in funding costs caused by the CBPS contributed to
this increase in issuance (Belsham et al., 2017; Salmon, 2017).
Our transaction-level dataset (discussed in Section 3) allows us to investigate trading
in the sterling corporate bond market during the CBPS purchase period. The sterling
corporate bond market is an OTC market intermediated by around fourteen main dealer
banks. The main investors in the market are insurance companies and asset managers.
Since only dealers could participate directly in the CBPS auctions, if investors wished
to sell bonds to the CBPS then they would need to sell them via dealers. This pattern
is reflected in the transaction-level data. Figure 3, which is adapted from Mallaburn
et al. (2019), shows net secondary market trading volume in eligible bonds by investor
type (primary market trades and trades with the CBPS are excluded). Positive numbers
indicate net buying volume while negative numbers indicate net selling volume. In the
period between the announcement of the CBPS and the start of purchases, insurance
companies and asset managers were net buyers of eligible bonds in the secondary market,
while dealers were net sellers. But during the purchase period, the main investors had
large net selling positions while dealers had large net buying positions, consistent with
investors selling bonds to dealers so that dealers could sell the bonds on to the CBPS.3
The transaction-level data also allow us to analyse how dealers traded around the
individual auctions. We split the week around each auction into two parts: a pre-auction
period consisting of the two full days before the auction plus the part of the auction day
before the open of the auction; and a post-auction period consisting of the two full days
after the auction plus the part of the auction day after the close of the auction. For
each dealer, we then compute their net secondary market trading volume in each bond
in these two periods. Figure 4 shows averages (across dealers, bonds and auctions) of
these pre- and post-auction net trading volumes for three groups of bonds: bonds that
were eligible but that the dealer did not offer in the auction; bonds that the dealer offered
unsuccessfully; and bonds that the dealer sold in the auction. Dealers could sell bonds to
the CBPS out of their own inventories. Alternatively, they could offer to sell bonds that
they did not already own, and if their offers were accepted, purchase the bonds in the
secondary market in order to deliver them to the CBPS. The figure shows that dealers
offered to sell to the CBPS bonds that they had bought in the run-up to the auction. But
they primarily bought the bonds that they sold to the CBPS after the auction results
were known. In part, this is likely to reflect dealers selling bonds on behalf of particular
clients.
3This pattern reversed during December 2016. This is likely to reflect two factors. First, the BoE ran
fewer auctions during December due to reduced liquidity around the Christmas period. Second, dealers
might have been reducing bond inventories ahead of year-end in order to improve regulatory capital and
leverage ratios.
9
2.4 How might the CBPS have impacted liquidity?
Market participants and academics have proposed several mechanisms by which central
bank asset purchases could impact liquidity. In theory, the impact on liquidity could be
positive or negative.
Stimulating trading: Central bank asset purchases involve market participants selling
bonds in exchange for cash. But cash and bonds are imperfect substitutes, so the initial
purchases are likely to stimulate further portfolio rebalancing (Joyce et al., 2011a). By
stimulating trading, this portfolio rebalancing could also improve liquidity.
Back-stop buyer: Dealers take risk by holding bonds on their balance sheets as market-
making inventory (Stoll, 1978). By providing a predictable source of demand for bonds,
asset purchases can reduce the inventory risk faced by dealers. This might make them
willing to hold larger inventories and could therefore facilitate market-making (Kandrac,
2018).
Search frictions: Absent new issuance, asset purchases lead to a reduction in the
quantity of bonds held by private investors. If there are search frictions, then this could
reduce trading by making it more difficult for investors to be matched (Ferdinandusse
et al., 2017). And if it becomes more difficult for dealers to source specific bonds in the
secondary market, then the costs and risks of market-making could increase, reducing
dealers’ willingness to intermediate trades (Kandrac, 2018). Moreover, a reduction in
the quantity of a bond available for trading by private investors might deter market
participation, leading to a thinner market and lower liquidity (Bolton and von Thadden,
1998).
Distorted price signals: Central bank asset purchases typically involve quantity tar-
gets, making the central bank relatively price-insensitive in its purchase decisions. Market
participants have argued that this can distort price signals and therefore reduce the will-
ingness of investors to trade (Financial Times, 2015).
Market participants in the sterling corporate bond market generally argued that the
CBPS improved secondary market liquidity (Belsham et al., 2017). The key channel
that they emphasised was that of the back-stop buyer: investors argued that predictable
demand from the CBPS made dealers more willing to hold market-making inventory
(Financial News, 2017). In this paper, we aim to estimate the impact of the CBPS on
liquidity more formally.
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3 Data
3.1 CBPS auction data
Our auction dataset includes the complete set of information determining CBPS pur-
chases. We observe granular information on each individual offer submitted, including:
the identity of the dealer, the ISIN (International Securities Identification Number) of the
bond, the offer quantity, the offer spread, the quantity of the offer that was accepted, and
the reason the offer was rejected (where applicable). We also observe the reserve spreads
for each bond and each auction.
The dataset covers 82 auctions taking place over the lifetime of the scheme, from 27
September 2016 to 27 April 2017. Over that period, 364 bonds were eligible at some
point, 306 of which were purchased at least once.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the auction data. For bonds that received at
least one offer in a given auction, the average sum of offer quantities was £9.2mn. For
bonds that were purchased in a given auction, the average total purchase size was around
£5mn. The maximum purchase amount of a single bond in a single auction was £10mn,
equal to the purchase limit.
On average, the spread between the offer yields submitted in the auction and the
average offer yield quoted in the secondary market was 1.25 basis points. This means
that, on average, auction participants were offering to sell bonds to the BoE at lower
prices than the prices that they were quoting to sell the same bonds to investors in the
secondary market. This might have reflected competition between dealers induced by the
auction process. Alternatively, it might have been because dealers were effectively selling
bonds on behalf of their clients.
As discussed in Section 2.2, the auction allocations were also influenced by reserve
spreads set by the BoE. The distribution of reserve spreads is shown in Figure 5 (the
chart pools across bonds and auctions). The majority of reserve spreads were below
the average market mid spread. However, in some cases the reserve spreads were set
substantially higher than quoted market spreads in order to reduce the pace of purchases
of particular bonds.
3.2 Corporate bond transaction data
To estimate liquidity measures for the corporate bond market, we use the transaction-level
‘Zen’ dataset maintained by the UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). This dataset
includes transaction reports for all secondary-market trades by EEA-regulated firms in
corporate bonds that are issued by UK firms, and all secondary-market trades by UK-
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regulated firms in any corporate bond. Since the large majority of the main dealers in
the sterling corporate bond market are UK-regulated firms, the dataset should cover the
majority of trading in sterling-denominated corporate bonds. And under the assumption
that most trading in euro-denominated bonds involves EEA-regulated dealers or investors,
the dataset should cover the majority of trading in euro-denominated bonds issued by UK
firms.
Each transaction report includes the date, time, ISIN, quantity, price, the identity of
the reporting firm, and (in most cases) the identity of their counterparty. The counter-
party information allows us to match reports in cases where both counterparties report
the trade. We drop trades that are implausibly large or small, or that have implausible
reported prices. We also drop trades that occur within one week of the bond’s announce-
ment date (trading volumes are much higher in the week after a bond is announced,
making this period unrepresentative of normal trading conditions in the bond).4
3.3 Liquidity measures
We estimate market liquidity at the bond level using the transaction-level Zen dataset.
There is no single accepted liquidity measure for bond markets (Schestag et al., 2016). We
therefore estimate a wide range of liquidity measures drawn from the academic literature.
The measures are summarised briefly below and defined in Appendix A. We split the
measures into three groups: measures of trading activity, measures of transaction costs,
and measures of price impact.
Sterling and euro corporate bonds trade relatively infrequently, with around one trade
per day on average in the Zen dataset, so we compute all liquidity measures at weekly
frequency. We also winsorise several liquidity measures at 2.5% to reduce the impact of
outliers.5 Summary statistics for all of the liquidity measures are provided in Table 2 for
the sample period January 2016 to December 2017.
Measures of trading activity. We compute four simple measures of trading activity:
sterling trading volume, number of trades, average trade size, and number of ‘block trades’.
For these measures, higher numbers are likely to indicate better liquidity. We define
a block trade to be one that is greater than £2mn, which is approximately the 90th
percentile of the trade size distribution. As reported in Table 2, the average trade size of
4As discussed in Section 2.3, there was an increase in sterling corporate bond issuance after the CBPS
was announced. Given that bonds trade most frequently shortly after they are issued, the increase in
issuance is likely to have caused an increase in average trading volumes. Since we drop trades around the
issuance date, this effect should not affect our analysis.
5We winsorise round-trip cost, Roll, effective spread, interquartile range, Amihud, and volatility-over-
volume.
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CBPS-eligible bonds is around £0.81mn, and eligible bonds trade on average around 4.4
times per week. As shown in Figure 6, the measures of trading activity exhibit substantial
volatility but no clear trend over the sample period. The measures of trading activity are
cruder than the measures of transaction costs and price impact. But their simplicity
means that they can be estimated more reliably than the other measures, with fewer
missing observations.
Measures of transaction costs. We also compute four measures of transaction costs.
These can be interpreted as transaction-based estimates of the bid-ask spread. Specifically,
we estimate the effective spread (Hong and Warga, 2000), the Roll measure (Roll, 1984),
the round-trip cost (Goldstein et al., 2007), and the interquartile range of traded prices
(Han and Zhou, 2011). For these measures, higher numbers indicate worse liquidity. These
measures suggest that the average transaction-based bid-ask spread of eligible bonds is
between 25 and 45 basis points (Table 2). As shown in Figure 7, all four of these measures
indicate that the liquidity of eligible bonds and ineligible sterling investment grade bonds
improved over the period during which CBPS purchases occurred.
Measures of price impact. Finally we compute two measures of price impact: the
Amihud measure (Amihud, 2002), and a simple implementation of the volatility-over-
volume measure of Fong et al. (2017). For these measures, higher numbers indicate worse
liquidity. The Amihud measure indicates that, on average, a £1mn trade moves the price
of eligible bonds by around 83 basis points. Meanwhile, volatility-over-volume suggests
that an increase in trading volume of £1mn increases price volatility by around 26 basis
points (Table 2). As with the measures of transaction costs, both measures of price
impact suggest that the liquidity of eligible bonds and ineligible sterling bonds improved
substantially over the CBPS purchase period (Figure 8).
While the majority of these measures indicate that liquidity in the sterling corporate
bond market improved as CBPS purchases took place, we cannot conclude that this im-
provement was driven by the CBPS. Multiple other factors might have been impacting
corporate bond liquidity during this period (e.g. the BoE’s other monetary policy actions,
investor perceptions of developments in the UK-EU negotiations, and the ECB’s Corpo-
rate Sector Purchase Programme). We therefore rely on weekly cross-sectional variation
across bonds to identify the impact of the CBPS purchases, as explained in Section 5.
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4 Announcement effects
Before estimating the impact of the purchases on liquidity, we investigate whether the
announcement of the policy itself had a direct impact on liquidity. Specifically, we estimate
the following cross-sectional regression:
∆Liquidityb = µ+ βEligibleb + φ
′Zb + b, (1)
where ∆Liquidityb is the liquidity of bond b in the calendar week after the announcement
(8 – 12 August) minus the liquidity in the calendar week before the announcement (25 – 29
July); and Zb is a set of bond-level control variables measured prior to the announcement:
amount outstanding, credit rating, residual maturity, residual maturity squared, industry
fixed effects, yield spread to the reference government bond, and amount outstanding of
gilts with a similar residual maturity.
The variable of interest is Eligibleb, which is an indicator variable equal to one for
bonds that were eligible for purchase by the CBPS and zero otherwise. Although the list
of eligible bonds was not published at the time of the announcement, the main eligibility
criteria were published, and Boneva et al. (2018) show that the spreads of eligible bonds fell
significantly more than the spreads of ineligible sterling bonds after the announcement,
indicating that investors were to a large extent able to predict which bonds would be
eligible. We consider two control groups: sterling-denominated investment grade bonds
that were never eligible (bonds issued by banks and insurance companies are excluded),
and euro-denominated bonds issued by firms who had also issued eligible bonds.
The results are summarised in Table 3 and Appendix C. There is evidence of signif-
icantly increased trading activity in eligible bonds relative to euro-denominated bonds.
This might have reflected investor positioning ahead of the purchase period, as illustrated
in Figure 3. However the estimated coefficients on the transaction cost and price impact
measures are statistically insignificant in most cases, suggesting that the initial announce-
ment did not cause an immediate change in the costs of trading. We now turn to the
question of whether the purchases impacted liquidity.
5 Impact of CBPS purchases on contemporaneous
liquidity
5.1 Addressing reverse causality
Identifying the impact of CBPS purchases on liquidity is challenging because the pur-
chases were not randomly assigned across bonds. Instead, they were determined by the
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intersection of the BoE’s demand and auction participants’ supply. But both of these
could have been affected by liquidity. For example, auction participants might have been
more likely to submit offers for less liquid bonds because it would be more costly to sell
them in the secondary market. And the purchase targets and risk management consider-
ations underlying the BoE’s reserve spreads (see Section 2) might have made it more or
less willing to purchase illiquid bonds. In either case, there would be a problem of reverse
causality, with liquidity impacting purchases rather than purchases impacting liquidity.
Importantly, this effect could go in either direction. As discussed in Section 1, similar
considerations apply to other episodes of central bank asset purchases that have been
studied in the literature.
Our granular offer-level auction dataset offers novel ways to reduce the magnitude of
any reverse causality. If liquidity impacted CBPS purchases, then this impact must have
come via auction participants’ supply (as expressed by their offers) or the BoE’s demand
(as expressed by its reserve spreads). But we are able to control for both of these. We
observe all of the individual offers by market participants to sell bonds to the BoE, and
can therefore use this information to construct bond-level proxies for the strength of
auction participants’ supply in each auction. Specifically, we construct two such proxies,
one based on quantity (the total nominal quantity of the bond offered in the auction,
summed across all auction participants) and one based on price (the volume-weighted
average spread between the offer yields in the auction and the offer yield prevailing in the
market). Similarly, we use the BoE’s bond-level reserve spread as a proxy to control for
the strength of its demand for the bond. By including these demand and supply proxies
in our regressions, we are able to control for the two potential channels of reverse causality
and should therefore reduce any bias arising from reverse causality. This argument is set
out formally in Appendix B.
As explained more precisely in Section 5.2, our analysis is based on difference-in-
differences regressions of liquidity on CBPS purchases. The regressions are estimated
at auction frequency (eligible bonds were auctioned once per week). The bond-level
treatment variable is the nominal amount purchased in the auction. So the treatment
group consists of bonds that were purchased in the auction, and bonds can be treated
multiple times because they can be purchased in multiple auctions. For robustness, we
use four different control groups.
In our benchmark regressions, the control group consists of bonds that received offers
in the auction but were not purchased, either because the offer spread was below the
reserve spread or because purchase limits were reached. Since the control group consists of
eligible bonds, we are able to control for demand and supply as described above. Note that
bonds frequently move between the treatment group and this control group depending on
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whether they have CBPS offers accepted. That is, treatment status is determined within
each auction, and bonds in the treatment group on one date are likely to be in the control
group on other dates. The identifying assumption is that - in the absence of purchases,
and conditional on demand and supply - the liquidity of purchased bonds would have
moved in line with the liquidity of this control group: the ‘parallel trends’ assumption.
This is very plausible, given that the BoE’s eligibility criteria ensured that the bonds in
the treatment and control groups had similar characteristics in terms of credit rating,
sector and geographical focus.6
Our second control group is a subset of the first. It consists of bonds that received
offers in the auction in which the offer spread was greater than the reserve spread (that is,
attractive to the BoE) but were not purchased because auction or issuer purchase limits
were reached within the auction. Given that these offers were at attractive prices, it
would have been particularly difficult for auction participants to predict that they would
be rejected. Including this control group acts as a robustness test against the possibility
that auction participants were using sophisticated bidding strategies that are not well
approximated by our two proxy variables for supply.
The bonds in the two control groups discussed above are likely to be close substitutes
to the bonds in the treatment group. This has the advantage that the parallel trends
assumption is likely to hold. However, it also raises the possibility that the impact of
purchases on the treatment group ‘spills over’ to the control group: investors who have
sold bonds to the CBPS might rebalance their portfolios into bonds in the control group,
and this might mean that the CBPS purchases also indirectly impact the liquidity of
control bonds.7 In order to obtain estimates that are less likely to be impacted by these
spillover effects, we repeat the analysis using two control groups that are less similar to
the treatment group: sterling-denominated investment grade corporate bonds that were
never eligible for the CBPS, and euro-denominated bonds issued by issuers who had also
issued eligible bonds.
We can use Figures 6, 7 and 8 to assess how well the parallel trends assumption holds
for these two additional control groups by observing trends in the liquidity measures
prior to the start of CBPS purchases. Over the pre-CBPS period, most of the liquidity
measures for eligible bonds and ineligible sterling bonds move relatively closely together,
providing support for the parallel trends assumption. The figures provide less support for
the parallel trends assumption in the case of the euro control group, which might reflect
6The parallel trends assumption cannot easily be visually inspected for this control group, given that
bonds frequently move between the treatment and control groups.
7Note that spillover effects on control bonds might be expected to be in the same direction as the
direct effect on treated bonds, meaning that our difference-in-differences estimates might be expected to
be underestimates of the true effect.
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differences in the investor base.
5.2 Baseline regression specification
For our baseline results, we run staggered difference-in-differences regressions at the bond-
auction level. Each regression uses data for bonds in a treatment group and bonds in a
control group, and takes the following form:
Liquiditybt = αb + µt + βPurchasedAmountbt + κX
Demand
bt + δ
′XSupplybt + bt, (2)
where:
• Liquiditybt is a measure of secondary market liquidity for bond b in the week starting
on the date of auction t.
• αb and µt are bond and auction fixed effects.
• PurchasedAmountbt is the total nominal quantity of bond b purchased in auction t,
denominated in sterling millions. Note that this is a continuous treatment variable.
• XDemandbt is the BoE’s reserve spread for bond b in auction t, which we use as a proxy
variable for the BoE’s demand for the bond.
• XSupplybt is a vector of two variables summarising the supply by auction participants
of bond b in auction t: the total nominal quantity offered in the auction (summed
across all auction participants); and the volume-weighted average spread between
auction participants’ offer yields and the average offer yield quoted in the secondary
market.
We run separate regressions for different liquidity measures and different control
groups. In each case, the treatment group consists of bonds for which PurchasedAmountbt
is greater than zero, i.e. bonds that were purchased in auction t. We consider four different
control groups (as discussed in Section 5.1):
• Offer: Bonds that were eligible in auction t and received offers, but were not
purchased (either because the offer spreads were below the reserve spread or because
purchase limits were reached).
• Limit: Bonds that were eligible in auction t and received offers in which the of-
fer spread was greater than the reserve spread, but were not purchased (because
purchase limits were reached). This is a subset of the previous control group.
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• Sterling: Sterling-denominated investment grade corporate bonds that were never
eligible. Bonds issued by banks and insurance companies are excluded.
• Euro: Euro-denominated bonds issued by issuers who had also issued eligible bonds.
Eligible bonds were auctioned once per week, but different bonds were auctioned on
different weekdays depending on the sector of the issuer. So for eligible bonds (i.e. the
treatment group and the first two control groups), the regressions only use data from
auctions in which the bond was eligible. And we estimate the liquidity measures using
trades in the week starting on the day that the bond was auctioned (excluding the period
on the auction day before the close of the auction). This is to ensure that the liquidity
measures are responding to actual purchases, rather than moving in anticipation of the
auctions.
Our third and fourth control groups consist of ineligible bonds. We match each of
these bonds to auctions based on the sector of the issuer. We then estimate the liquidity
measures for these bonds in the same way as for eligible bonds, i.e. using trades in the
week starting on the day of the auction to which the bond was matched. Since these
bonds are ineligible, purchased amount is always equal to zero, and the demand and
supply proxies are unobserved and are therefore excluded from the regressions.
The coefficient of interest is β. This provides an estimate of the impact of CBPS
purchases on the liquidity of purchased bonds in the week following the auction.
Standard errors are double-clustered at the bond and auction levels.
5.3 Baseline results
Our results are summarised in Table 4, with more detailed results reported in Appendix D.
The results for the first control group are shown in column (1). We find that, in response
to a £1mn increase in the amount purchased, the number of weekly trades increased by
around 0.3 and the weekly trading volume increased by around £0.7mn. These effects are
likely to be partly mechanical, reflecting the design of the auctions.8 However, the other
measures of trading activity also suggest that the CBPS purchases improved liquidity.
Following a typical purchase of £5mn, the average trade size increased by around £0.57mn
(compared to an average of £0.81mn for eligible bonds over the sample period), and the
number of ‘block trades’ (trades larger than £2mn) increased by around 0.46 (compared
to an average of 0.45).
8The main holders of sterling corporate bonds are asset managers and insurers (see Section 2), who
were not eligible to participate directly in the auctions. In order to sell bonds to the BoE, these investors
would have to ask dealers to submit offers on their behalf. If the offer were accepted, then the investor
would sell the bond to the dealer so that the dealer could deliver it to the CBPS. This would lead to an
increase in the number of trades and volume of trading directly.
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The measures of transaction costs also indicate that CBPS purchases improved liquid-
ity. A typical purchase of £5mn was associated with a reduction in the effective spread
of around 4.3 basis points (compared to an average of 26 basis points) and a reduction
in the Roll measure of the bid-ask spread of 1.8 basis points (compared to an average of
41 basis points). The estimated coefficients on the other measures of transaction costs
(round-trip cost and interquartile range) are statistically insignificant.
We also find that the CBPS reduced the price impact of trades. Following a £5mn
purchase, the Amihud measure falls by 4.1 basis points (compared to an average of 83
basis points), and the volatility-over-volume measure falls by around 3.4 basis points
(compared to an average of 26 basis points).
The results using the other three control groups, shown in columns (2)-(4) of Table 4,
are very similar.
Overall these results indicate that the CBPS purchases improved the liquidity of pur-
chased bonds in the week following the auction. This suggests that the positive channels
from asset purchases to liquidity discussed in Section 2.4 outweighed the negative chan-
nels in this case. This is consistent with reports from market participants in the sterling
corporate bond market. The key channel that they emphasised was that of the back-stop
buyer: predictable demand from the CBPS made dealers more willing to hold market-
making inventory and intermediate trades (Belsham et al., 2017; Financial News, 2017).
5.4 Robustness tests
We perform two tests to address the possibility that there is remaining reverse causality
from liquidity to purchases, even after controlling for demand and supply (results available
upon request). First, we re-estimate our baseline regressions, but use liquidity in the week
before the auction as the dependent variable (rather than liquidity in the week after the
auction). For most liquidity measures, there is no significant relationship between pre-
auction liquidity and amount purchased. However for some liquidity measures (trading
volume, average trade size and round-trip cost), we find evidence that the CBPS was
more likely to purchase bonds that were less liquid prior to the auction. This suggests
that our finding that purchases improved liquidity is unlikely to be driven by reverse
causality. Second, we estimate our baseline regressions including the lagged dependent
variable as an additional control variable, using the system GMM estimator of Blundell
and Bond (1998). The results from this test are generally similar to our baseline results,
although statistical significance is reduced for some liquidity measures. The reduction in
statistical significance could reflect a reduction in efficiency arising from the instrumental
variables approach. The coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is generally small
and statistically insignificant, indicating that it is not an important omitted variable.
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We perform three further robustness tests (results available upon request). First, we
re-estimate the baseline regressions for the first two control groups, but exclude the proxy
variables for demand and supply. Second, we scale the treatment variable (purchased
amount) by amount outstanding, to allow for the possibility that the effect of purchases
depends on the quantity of the bond in issue. Third, we repeat the analysis using the
common correlated effects estimator of Pesaran (2006), which controls for unobserved
common shocks to both purchases and liquidity. The results from all of these robustness
tests are similar to our baseline results.
5.5 Heterogeneous effects
In this subsection we investigate whether the effects estimated in Section 5.3 varied across
bonds or across time.
In recent years, market participants have argued that there has been a reduction in
the liquidity of corporate bonds in general (Committee on the Global Financial System,
2014) and sterling corporate bonds in particular (Elliott and Middeldorp, 2016; Financial
Conduct Authority, 2017). Market participants and policymakers have raised the concern
that the reduction in liquidity has been larger for less liquid bonds: that is, that there
has been a ‘bifurcation’ in liquidity across bonds (Dudley, 2016). We therefore investigate
how the impact of the CBPS varied across bonds according to their liquidity prior to the
scheme: did the CBPS contribute to or lean against any bifurcation in liquidity?
To address this question, we introduce interaction terms to extend our baseline spec-
ification to the following regression:
Liquiditybt = αb + µt + βPurchasedAmountbt (3)
+φ (PurchasedAmountbt × Pre-CBPS liquidityb)
+κXDemandbt
+γ
(
XDemandbt × Pre-CBPS liquidityb
)
+δ′XSupplybt
+ψ′
(
XSupplybt × Pre-CBPS liquidityb
)
+ bt,
where Pre-CBPS liquidityb is defined as the level of liquidity for bond b in the week
before the announcement of the CBPS, and all other variables are defined as above.
Pre-CBPS liquidityb is demeaned.
The coefficient of interest is φ, which provides an estimate of how the impact of CBPS
purchases on liquidity varied with the level of pre-CBPS liquidity.
The results for this regression are summarised in Table 5, and a full set of results is
20
reported in Appendix E. As before, different columns relate to different control groups.
For all dependent variables, positive coefficients on the interaction term would indicate
that CBPS purchases improved liquidity more for bonds that were already more liquid
(consistent with bifurcation), while negative coefficients would indicate that the CBPS
had more beneficial impacts on the liquidity of less liquid bonds. We find that almost all
estimated coefficients on the interaction between purchases and pre-CBPS liquidity are
statistically insignificant.
As an additional test of the bifurcation hypothesis, we estimate how the impact of the
CBPS purchases varied according to credit rating. These regressions take the same form
as equation (3), except that we replace the variable Pre-CBPS liquidityb with an ordinal
numeric variable representing the bond’s average credit rating across the three major
rating agencies. Again, the estimated coefficient on the interaction term is statistically
insignificant in nearly all cases (results available upon request).
Overall, these results do not indicate that the impact of the CBPS differed systemat-
ically across purchased bonds.
The strength of the channels from asset purchases to liquidity discussed in Section 2.4
is likely to depend on time-varying factors such as the expected time until completion
of the scheme. We therefore estimate whether the size of the impact of purchases on
liquidity established in Section 5.3 varied over the lifetime of the scheme. To that end,
we estimate the following regression:
Liquiditybt = αb + µt + βPurchasedAmountbt (4)
+φ (PurchasedAmountbt × Trendt)
+κXDemandbt
+γ
(
XDemandbt × Trendt
)
+δ′XSupplybt
+ψ′
(
XSupplybt × Trendt
)
+ bt,
where Trendt is a linear time trend variable at weekly frequency (defined to be zero at
the midpoint of the purchase period).
The results are summarised in Table 6 and Appendix F. For the measures of trading
activity (number of trades, trading volume, average trade size and number of block trades),
the estimated coefficient on the interaction between purchased amount and the time trend
is generally negative and significant. This indicates that the positive impact of CBPS
purchases on trading activity decreased over the purchase period. For the other liquidity
measures, the estimated coefficient on the interaction term is statistically insignificant for
most control groups.
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The reduced impact on trading activity might have reflected a weakening in the back-
stop buyer channel over the course of the scheme. As the CBPS approached its £10bn
purchase target, the future time period over which dealers would be able to sell excess
inventory to the CBPS reduced. Therefore the reduction in inventory risk associated with
the CBPS might have dissipated, potentially reducing the positive impact of the CBPS
on dealers’ willingness to intermediate trades.
6 Longer-term impact
The results in Section 5 indicate that CBPS purchases improved the liquidity of bonds in
the week immediately following the purchase. We now turn to the question of whether
the purchases had any longer-lasting impacts on liquidity. We approach this question in
two ways. First we consider whether the initial impact persisted beyond the first week.
Then we investigate whether there were ‘stock effects’ from total CBPS purchases.
6.1 Persistence of the initial impact
In order to test whether the contemporaneous impact persisted beyond the first week, we
add the first lag of purchases to regression (2). This results in the following specification:
Liquiditybt = αb + µt + βPurchasedAmountbt (5)
+φPurchasedAmountb,t−1
+κXDemandbt + δ
′XSupplybt + bt.
The results are summarised in Table 7 and reported in full in Appendix G. The
estimates suggest that the impact of purchases on liquidity was short-lived. In most
cases, the coefficient on the first lag of purchases is statistically insignificant and much
smaller than the coefficient on contemporaneous purchases.
6.2 Stock effects
Our second approach is based on comparing how the liquidity of bonds changed between
the start and end of purchases. We run cross-sectional regressions of the following form:
∆Liquidityb = µ+ βTotalPuchasedAmountb + φ
′Zb + κ′∆Xb + b, (6)
where ∆Liquidityb is the liquidity of bond b in the week after purchases were completed
minus the liquidity in the week before the CBPS was announced. The primary variable
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of interest is TotalPurchasedAmountb, which is defined as the total quantity of bond b
purchased by the CBPS over the entire purchase period. We include two sets of bond-
specific control variables: Zb and ∆Xb. Zb consists of variables measured just prior
to the announcement of the CBPS: amount outstanding, credit rating, residual maturity,
residual maturity squared, industry fixed effects, yield spread to reference gilt, and amount
outstanding of gilts with a similar residual maturity (specifically, gilts with a residual
maturity within two years of the residual maturity of bond b). ∆Xb consists of variables
computed over the duration of the scheme: change in credit rating, change in amount
outstanding of gilts with a similar residual maturity, and BoE QE purchases of gilts with
a similar maturity.
The treatment group is bonds that were purchased during the CBPS period. We
consider two control groups: bonds that were eligible but never purchased, and ineli-
gible sterling investment grade corporate bonds (bonds issued by banks and insurance
companies are excluded).
The results are summarised in Table 8, with more detailed results reported in Appendix
H. In almost all cases, the estimated impact of total purchases on liquidity is statistically
insignificant. This suggests that the liquidity effects of the CBPS did not extend beyond
the active phase of purchases. In other words - and following the terminology of D’Amico
and King (2013) - we find that the CBPS had ‘flow effects’ on bond liquidity, but that
there were no ‘stock effects’ arising from the BoE’s total holdings of corporate bonds.
This is consistent with the ‘back-stop buyer’ channel discussed in Section 2.4: the CBPS
might have supported liquidity by providing a committed buyer to the market, but this
impact did not persist once CBPS purchases were completed.
In this respect, our findings are in line with Christensen and Gillan (2017), who study
the impact of the Federal Reserve’s purchases of TIPS on liquidity premia during QE2.
They find that TIPS liquidity premia fell during the program, but that the effects dissi-
pated towards the end of the purchases. This led them to conclude that, although QE
programs can improve financial market functioning through a liquidity channel, the liq-
uidity effects are only sustained as long as QE purchases are ongoing and expected to
continue.
7 Discussion and conclusions
In August 2016, the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee announced a Corpo-
rate Bond Purchase Scheme (CBPS) to purchase up to £10bn of sterling corporate bonds.
The objective of the purchases was to impart monetary stimulus by lowering corporate
bond yields, triggering portfolio rebalancing, and stimulating corporate bond issuance.
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But a potential unintended consequence was an impact on market liquidity. To estimate
whether the purchases did indeed impact liquidity, we create a novel dataset by combining
transaction-level data from the corporate bond market with proprietary offer-level data
from the CBPS auctions.
Identifying the impact of central bank asset purchases on liquidity is plagued with
endogeneity concerns, particularly the possibility of reverse causality. For example, if the
central bank aims to purchase more or less liquid bonds, then liquidity will be impacting
purchases as well as purchases impacting liquidity. But the auction design of the CBPS
and the granularity of our offer-level dataset offer novel ways to alleviate this reverse
causality problem. In particular, we are able to control for the impact of liquidity on
purchases by constructing proxy variables for auction participants’ supply of bonds (based
on their offers in the auctions) and the BoE’s demand for bonds (based on the reserve
prices that it set ahead of the auctions).
Across a range of transaction-based liquidity measures, we find that CBPS purchases
improved the liquidity of purchased bonds in the week following the purchase. This
impact on liquidity does not appear to persist beyond one week: we find little evidence of
any association between liquidity and lagged purchases. Similarly, when we compare the
overall change in liquidity between the start and end of the scheme, we find no evidence
that the liquidity of purchased bonds changed systematically compared to sterling bonds
that were not purchased. In other words, we find that the CBPS had positive ‘flow effects’
on bond liquidity, but that there were no ‘stock effects’ on liquidity arising from the BoE’s
total holdings of corporate bonds (D’Amico and King, 2013).
That said, Figures 7 and 8 do show substantial improvements in the liquidity of sterling
corporate bonds - both eligible and ineligible - over the lifetime of the scheme. We
cannot conclude that these improvements were driven by the CBPS, because multiple
other factors might have been impacting corporate bond liquidity during this period.
But one possibility is that portfolio rebalancing caused by the scheme contributed to a
generalised improvement in liquidity across the entire sterling corporate bond market.
This would be consistent with D’Amico and Kaminska (2019), who find evidence of price
spillover effects of the CBPS in the case of highly rated bonds with similar characteristics.
Our results have important policy implications. Policymakers and market participants
have repeatedly raised concerns that asset purchases could have the unintended conse-
quence of causing a deterioration in liquidity. Our results provide evidence that, in the
case of the CBPS, the purchases caused an improvement, rather than a deterioration, in
liquidity. While our empirical tests are not designed to sharply differentiate between the
different channels through which asset purchases can impact liquidity, the results appear
consistent with a scenario in which the purchases provided dealers with confidence that
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they could sell bonds to the BoE if needed, and thereby increased dealers’ willingness to
intermediate trades. It seems plausible that this channel was strengthened by the fact
that the purchases were implemented via auction, which gave dealers more influence over
which bonds were bought, compared to an operational design in which the central bank
purchases bonds bilaterally.
The CBPS was a monetary policy tool, and did not have an explicit objective of im-
proving market liquidity. However, since the financial crisis, policymakers and academics
have paid increased attention to the question of whether, and under what conditions,
the central bank should act as ‘market-maker of last resort’ (MMLR) in markets suffer-
ing a reduction in liquidity (Bank for International Settlements, 2014). The results in
this paper indicate that asset purchases conducted via auction can improve the liquidity
of corporate bond markets and therefore have implications for the design of any future
MMLR operations.
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Figure 1: Corporate bond spreads
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Notes: The chart shows option-adjusted spreads for investment grade non-financial cor-
porate bonds. The shaded region shows the period of CBPS purchases.
Source: Bank of America.
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Figure 2: Sterling corporate bond issuance
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Notes: The chart shows monthly gross issuance of sterling-denominated investment grade
non-financial corporate bonds.
Source: Thomson Reuters.
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Figure 3: Net trading in eligible corporate bonds
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Notes: The chart shows monthly net secondary market trading volumes in bonds that
were eligible for the CBPS, estimated using the transaction-level Zen dataset. Primary
market trades and trades with the CBPS itself are excluded. Positive numbers indicate
net buying volume while negative numbers indicate net selling volume. The shaded region
shows the period of CBPS purchases.
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Figure 4: Dealer trading behaviour around the auctions
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Notes: The chart shows average net secondary market trading volumes by CBPS partici-
pants (dealers) in the days around the auctions, estimated using the transaction-level Zen
dataset. Primary market trades and trades with the CBPS itself are excluded. Positive
numbers indicate net buying volume while negative numbers indicate net selling volume.
‘Pre-auction’ refers to the two full days before the auction plus the part of the auction day
before the open of the auction. ‘Post-auction’ refers to the two full days after the auction
plus the part of the auction day after the close of the auction. ‘Eligible (not offered)’
refers to bonds that were eligible in the auction but that the dealer did not offer in the
auction. ‘Offered (not sold)’ refers to bonds that the dealer unsuccessfully offered in the
auction. ‘Sold’ refers to bonds that the dealer sold in the auction.
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Figure 5: Distribution of reserve spreads
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Notes: The chart is a histogram of the reserve spreads set by the Bank of England ahead
of CBPS auctions. Quoted market mid spreads have been subtracted from the reserve
spreads. Spreads greater than 25 basis points have been allocated to the highest bin, and
spreads less than -25 basis points have been allocated to the lowest bin.
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Figure 6: Measures of trading activity
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(b) Weekly trading volume (£mn)
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Notes: The charts show liquidity measures for the corporate bond market estimated using
the transaction-level Zen dataset. The measures are computed for individual bonds at
weekly frequency, then averaged across bonds within a group. The charts show monthly
averages. ‘Eligible’ refers to bonds that were at some point eligible for the CBPS. ‘In-
eligible sterling’ refers to sterling-denominated investment grade corporate bonds that
were never eligible for the CBPS (bonds issued by banks and insurance companies are
excluded). ‘Euro’ refers to euro-denominated bonds issued by issuers who had also issued
eligible bonds. The shaded region shows the period of CBPS purchases. Higher numbers
indicate better liquidity. Definitions of the measures are provided in Appendix A.
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Figure 7: Measures of transaction costs
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Notes: The charts show liquidity measures for the corporate bond market estimated using
the transaction-level Zen dataset. The measures are computed for individual bonds at
weekly frequency, then averaged across bonds within a group. The charts show monthly
averages. ‘Eligible’ refers to bonds that were at some point eligible for the CBPS. ‘In-
eligible sterling’ refers to sterling-denominated investment grade corporate bonds that
were never eligible for the CBPS (bonds issued by banks and insurance companies are
excluded). ‘Euro’ refers to euro-denominated bonds issued by issuers who had also issued
eligible bonds. The shaded region shows the period of CBPS purchases. Higher numbers
indicate worse liquidity. Definitions of the measures are provided in Appendix A.
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Figure 8: Measures of price impact
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Notes: The charts show liquidity measures for the corporate bond market estimated using
the transaction-level Zen dataset. The measures are computed for individual bonds at
weekly frequency, then averaged across bonds within a group. The charts show monthly
averages. ‘Eligible’ refers to bonds that were at some point eligible for the CBPS. ‘In-
eligible sterling’ refers to sterling-denominated investment grade corporate bonds that
were never eligible for the CBPS (bonds issued by banks and insurance companies are
excluded). ‘Euro’ refers to euro-denominated bonds issued by issuers who had also issued
eligible bonds. The shaded region shows the period of CBPS purchases. Higher numbers
indicate worse liquidity. Definitions of the measures are provided in Appendix A.
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Table 1: CBPS auction data summary statistics
Statistic N Mean Min Pctl(25) Median Pctl(75) Max St. Dev.
Total offer amount (GBP mn) 4,275 9.164 1.000 3.000 6.300 12.100 78.600 9.027
Average offer spread (bps) 4,275 1.251 −62.000 −0.048 1.600 3.333 25.000 4.634
Total purchased amount (GBP mn) 1,622 4.827 0.100 2.000 4.000 8.000 10.000 3.294
Notes: The table shows summary statistics from the offer-level CBPS auction dataset. One observation refers to a bond-auction pair.
‘Total offer amount’ is the total quantity of a single bond offered by auction participants in a single auction, in nominal terms. ‘Average
offer spread’ is the volume-weighted average spread between auction participants’ offer yields and the average offer yield quoted in the
secondary market. ‘Total purchased amount’ is the total quantity of a single bond purchased in a single auction, in nominal terms. The
summary statistics for total offer amount and average offer spread are computed using observations where there was at least one offer
for the bond in the auction. The summary statistics for total purchased amount are computed using observations where the bond was
purchased in the auction.
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Table 2: Liquidity measure summary statistics
Statistic N Mean Median St. Dev.
Eligible bonds
Number of trades 36,042 4.423 3 6.122
Trading volume (GBP mn) 36,042 3.532 0.936 7.194
Average trade size (GBP mn) 27,383 0.809 0.477 1.107
Number of block trades 36,042 0.454 0 1.107
Effective spread (bps) 14,724 25.832 18.133 42.771
Roll (bps) 14,781 40.904 25.149 47.262
Round-trip cost (bps) 7,079 44.075 31.563 39.237
Interquartile range (bps) 22,498 42.617 29.320 41.695
Amihud (bps) 20,063 83.290 44.081 103.904
Volatility-over-volume (bps) 14,781 25.948 15.035 30.054
Ineligible sterling investment grade bonds
Number of trades 52,166 2.814 0 6.877
Trading volume (GBP mn) 52,166 2.159 0.000 6.354
Average trade size (GBP mn) 20,161 0.856 0.496 1.363
Number of block trades 52,166 0.273 0 0.939
Effective spread (bps) 11,437 25.823 18.480 41.108
Roll (bps) 11,614 37.455 24.137 42.492
Round-trip cost (bps) 6,200 44.143 32.900 37.487
Interquartile range (bps) 16,769 40.294 27.270 40.588
Amihud (bps) 15,459 81.759 44.259 101.042
Volatility-over-volume (bps) 11,614 21.187 12.176 25.904
Euro-denominated bonds issued by eligible issuers
Number of trades 56,659 8.148 4 14.424
Trading volume (GBP mn) 56,659 5.230 1.313 11.141
Average trade size (GBP mn) 39,896 0.658 0.443 0.891
Number of block trades 56,659 0.593 0 1.535
Effective spread (bps) 25,432 14.322 9.984 29.151
Roll (bps) 29,930 23.704 14.896 28.692
Round-trip cost (bps) 15,671 27.657 19.197 26.542
Interquartile range (bps) 36,570 25.081 16.308 27.537
Amihud (bps) 32,176 46.322 26.641 61.798
Volatility-over-volume (bps) 29,930 12.149 6.956 17.327
Notes: The table shows summary statistics of liquidity measures for the corporate bond
market estimated using the transaction-level Zen dataset. The measures are computed at
weekly frequency for the sample period January 2016 to December 2017. Definitions of
the measures are provided in Appendix A.
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Table 3: Announcement effects
Control group
Dependent variable Sterling Euro
Number of trades 0.223 2.940
0.792 0.052
Trading volume (GBP mn) 0.860 4.515
0.387 0.003
Average trade size (GBP mn) -0.073 0.240
0.674 0.064
Number of block trades 0.119 0.448
0.429 0.029
Effective spread (bps) 5.249 23.418
0.623 0.002
Roll (bps) 2.431 -8.237
0.804 0.194
Round-trip cost (bps) 35.026 -13.335
0.062 0.177
Interquartile range (bps) 1.515 4.841
0.836 0.349
Amihud (bps) -14.982 -15.670
0.519 0.306
Volatility-over-volume (bps) -2.788 -6.002
0.609 0.095
Notes: The table shows estimates of β from equation (1). p-values are shown beneath the
coefficient estimates, and are computed using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
Full regression results are shown in Appendix C.
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Table 4: Impact of CBPS purchases on contemporaneous liquidity
Control group
Dependent variable Offer Limit Sterling Euro
Number of trades 0.289 0.246 0.385 0.389
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Trading volume (GBP mn) 0.739 0.776 0.978 0.978
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Average trade size (GBP mn) 0.114 0.142 0.145 0.144
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of block trades 0.091 0.090 0.108 0.110
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Effective spread (bps) -0.854 -0.850 -0.950 -0.887
0.022 0.078 0.085 0.086
Roll (bps) -0.357 -0.693 -0.537 -0.407
0.067 0.044 0.172 0.292
Round-trip cost (bps) 0.097 -0.951 -0.469 -0.265
0.820 0.139 0.248 0.502
Interquartile range (bps) 0.203 0.006 -0.042 0.342
0.359 0.987 0.889 0.293
Amihud (bps) -0.828 -2.080 -2.742 -2.301
0.092 0.001 0.000 0.001
Volatility-over-volume (bps) -0.684 -0.877 -0.941 -0.847
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: The table shows estimates of β from equation (2). p-values are shown beneath
the coefficient estimates, and are computed using standard errors double-clustered at the
bond and auction levels. Full regression results are shown in Appendix D.
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Table 5: Heterogeneity of impact by pre-CBPS liquidity
Control group
Dependent variable Offer Limit Sterling Euro
Number of trades -0.004 -0.005 0.006 0.005
0.490 0.553 0.484 0.532
Trading volume (GBP mn) 0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.001
0.974 0.889 0.690 0.795
Average trade size (GBP mn) 0.012 0.016 -0.004 -0.006
0.394 0.296 0.790 0.696
Number of block trades -0.001 -0.003 0.004 0.003
0.943 0.781 0.451 0.527
Effective spread (bps) -0.019 -0.009 -0.016 -0.017
0.072 0.443 0.234 0.185
Roll (bps) 0.004 0.008 -0.001 0.002
0.674 0.501 0.949 0.875
Round-trip cost (bps) 0.011 -0.002 -0.010 -0.006
0.359 0.926 0.512 0.695
Interquartile range (bps) 0.004 0.000 0.003 -0.001
0.513 0.949 0.761 0.910
Amihud (bps) -0.004 -0.002 -0.014 -0.017
0.532 0.806 0.238 0.171
Volatility-over-volume (bps) -0.004 -0.005 -0.009 -0.012
0.526 0.513 0.338 0.230
Notes: The table shows estimates of φ from equation (3). p-values are shown beneath
the coefficient estimates, and are computed using standard errors double-clustered at the
bond and auction levels. Full regression results are shown in Appendix E.
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Table 6: Variation in contemporaneous impact over time
Control group
Dependent variable Offer Limit Sterling Euro
Number of trades -0.009 -0.006 -0.010 -0.009
0.069 0.333 0.071 0.114
Trading volume (GBP mn) -0.022 -0.021 -0.018 -0.017
0.002 0.011 0.002 0.004
Average trade size (GBP mn) -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003
0.002 0.083 0.001 0.003
Number of block trades -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
0.014 0.041 0.004 0.005
Effective spread (bps) 0.048 0.056 0.041 0.004
0.235 0.353 0.369 0.914
Roll (bps) -0.005 -0.082 0.002 -0.044
0.838 0.066 0.936 0.048
Round-trip cost (bps) 0.009 0.077 -0.064 -0.140
0.844 0.259 0.168 0.001
Interquartile range (bps) -0.001 -0.027 -0.039 -0.132
0.953 0.391 0.118 0.000
Amihud (bps) 0.029 -0.034 0.057 -0.099
0.647 0.652 0.358 0.098
Volatility-over-volume (bps) 0.029 0.011 0.012 -0.030
0.056 0.515 0.247 0.040
Notes: The table shows estimates of φ from equation (4). p-values are shown beneath
the coefficient estimates, and are computed using standard errors double-clustered at the
bond and auction levels. Full regression results are shown in Appendix F.
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Table 7: Impact of lagged CBPS purchases on liquidity
Control group
Dependent variable Offer Limit Sterling Euro
Number of trades 0.053 0.058 0.031 0.037
0.244 0.324 0.539 0.477
Trading volume (GBP mn) 0.068 0.075 0.037 0.042
0.328 0.291 0.617 0.562
Average trade size (GBP mn) 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.009
0.697 0.684 0.613 0.449
Number of block trades 0.011 0.011 0.003 0.004
0.355 0.323 0.817 0.761
Effective spread (bps) 0.110 -0.043 -0.149 -0.064
0.704 0.919 0.698 0.873
Roll (bps) 0.502 0.554 0.403 0.610
0.104 0.155 0.353 0.124
Round-trip cost (bps) 0.226 0.371 0.778 0.921
0.517 0.461 0.122 0.058
Interquartile range (bps) -0.020 -0.079 0.066 0.281
0.935 0.805 0.869 0.531
Amihud (bps) -0.132 -0.860 -1.274 -0.975
0.791 0.169 0.062 0.144
Volatility-over-volume (bps) 0.197 0.159 0.360 0.436
0.225 0.311 0.077 0.048
Notes: The table shows estimates of φ from equation (5). p-values are shown beneath
the coefficient estimates, and are computed using standard errors double-clustered at the
bond and auction levels. Full regression results are shown in Appendix G.
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Table 8: Stock effects
Control group
Dependent variable Eligible Sterling
Number of trades 0.008 -0.006
0.809 0.807
Trading volume (GBP mn) -0.040 -0.067
0.208 0.006
Average trade size (GBP mn) 0.001 -0.001
0.929 0.775
Number of block trades -0.005 -0.009
0.298 0.022
Effective spread (bps) -0.011 0.386
0.983 0.269
Roll (bps) 0.134 0.075
0.814 0.823
Round-trip cost (bps) 1.126 -0.859
0.544
Interquartile range (bps) -0.117 -0.121
0.625 0.492
Amihud (bps) -0.627 -0.845
0.439 0.122
Volatility-over-volume (bps) -0.030 0.024
0.931 0.909
Notes: The table shows estimates of β from equation (6). p-values are shown beneath the
coefficient estimates, and are computed using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
Full regression results are shown in Appendix H.
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A Definitions of liquidity measures
We compute ten liquidity measures using the transaction-level Zen dataset. All mea-
sures are computed at the individual bond level. Since corporate bonds trade relatively
infrequently, the measures are computed at weekly frequency.
Number of trades. Number of trades within the week.
Trading volume. Total trading volume within the week, denominated in £mn.
Average trade size. Average trade size, denominated in £mn.
Number of block trades. Number of trades with a market value greater than or equal
to £2mn, which is approximately the 90th percentile of the trade size distribution.
Effective spread. The effective spread is used by Hong and Warga (2000), among
others, as an estimate of the average bid-ask spread. We compute this measure as the
volume-weighted average price in trades where a dealer is selling to a non-dealer, minus
the volume-weighted average price in trades where a dealer is buying from a non-dealer,
divided by the volume-weighted average price across all trades. The units are basis points.
To compute this measure, we require there to be at least one sell trade and one buy trade
within the week.
Roll. Roll (1984) shows that under certain assumptions, the effective bid-ask spread is
equal to two times the square root of the negative of the first-order serial covariance of
returns. For a given bond and a given week, define ri to be the return on the ith trade.
We then compute the Roll measure as
Roll = 2
√
max {0,−cov (ri, ri−1)}.
The units are basis points. We only compute this measure for weeks with at least four
trades.
Round-trip cost. Following Goldstein et al. (2007), we estimate the round-trip cost
of trading a bond as an additional measure of the bid-ask spread. Specifically, we search
for instances in which a given dealer buys a bond from a non-dealer, and then the same
dealer sells the same bond to a different non-dealer within the same week (or vice versa).
We then find the dealer’s return on this chain of transactions. The units are basis points.
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Interquartile range. As an alternative estimate of the bid-ask spread, Han and Zhou
(2011) use the interquartile range of traded prices, divided by the average price. The
units are basis points. We require at least two trades within the week to compute this
measure.
Amihud. Amihud (2002) measures liquidity as the ratio of absolute return to trading
volume. This measure is intended to capture the price impact of trading. Following
Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012), we compute the Amihud measure at the level of individual
trades, then average over the trade-level values each week to obtain a measure at weekly
frequency. More precisely, for a given bond and a given week, define ri to be the return
and Qi to be the trade size (in £mn) of the ith trade, and define N to be the number of
trades. We then compute the Amihud measure as
Amihud =
1
N − 1
N∑
i=2
|ri|
Qi
.
The units are basis points. We require at least two trades within the week to compute
this measure. We exclude trades smaller than £100k since these can introduce significant
noise.
Volatility-over-volume. As an additional measure of price impact, we use the volatility-
over-volume measure of Fong et al. (2017). For a given bond and a given week, let σ2 be
the variance of traded prices and let V be the total trading volume (in £mn). We then
compute volatility-over-volume as
V oV =
√
σ2
V
.
The units are basis points, and we only compute this measure for weeks with at least four
trades.
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B Econometric model
We provide an econometric justification for our benchmark model. We suppose that
liquidity is determined by the following equation:
Lbt = αb + µt + βPbt + δ
ᵀZbt + ebt, (7)
where Lbt denotes the liquidity of bond b in period t, Pbt denotes auction purchases, and
Zbt ∈ Rkz is a vector of latent signals about liquidity observed by market participants but
not by the econometrician. We suppose that purchases are determined by demand and
supply factors, so that
Pbt = ab + ct + θ
ᵀXbt + ubt, (8)
where Xbt = (D
ᵀ
bt, S
ᵀ
bt)
ᵀ ∈ Rkx . The demand and supply measures are themselves driven
by the latent liquidity factor, i.e.,
Xbt = ωb + φt +BZbt + vbt. (9)
Here, αb, µt, ab, ct, ωb, and φt are unobserved bond-specific and time-specific fixed effects
whose relations with other variables are not restricted in any way. Because Zbt is not
observed, the usual difference-in-differences estimator of liquidity Lbt on purchases Pbt
would be inconsistent. The model shares some similarities with Pesaran (2006), except
that the latent factors in our case vary over both bonds and time in an unspecified way.
Suppose that kx = kz = k and that B is of full rank.
9 In this case, we may write
Zbt = B
−1 (Xbt − vbt − ωb − φt) ,
and hence substituting into (7) we obtain
Lbt = α
∗
b + γ
∗
t + βPbt + d
ᵀXbt + e
∗
bt, (10)
where e∗bt = ebt−δᵀB−1vbt is a linear combination of ebt and vbt, while α∗b and γ∗t are linear
combinations of the fixed effects from the liquidity equation, the demand equation, and
the supply equation. Taking double differences (across b and t), we obtain
L˜bt = βP˜bt + d
ᵀX˜bt + e˜
∗
bt (11)
P˜bt = θ
ᵀX˜bt + u˜bt
X˜bt = BZ˜bt + v˜bt,
9This is only for exposition; the argument also works provided rank(B) ≥ kz, i.e., more X than Z.
48
where L˜bt = ∆∆Lbt, P˜bt = ∆∆Pbt, etc. Note that e˜
∗
bt contains v˜bt, which is correlated
with X˜bt and P˜bt, the included variables in (11), the equation of interest. This is like the
classical measurement error problem: since X is an imperfect measure of Z, it usually
leads to biased OLS coefficients (Aigner et al., 1984). However, because P is only driven
by L through Z, this effect can be eliminated, at least as far as the main effect of interest,
using the partitioned regression formula. Let EL(Y |X) denote the best linear predictor
of a random variable Y by a random variable X. We have
EL(L˜bt|X˜bt) = βEL(P˜bt|X˜bt) + dᵀX˜bt + EL(e˜∗bt|X˜bt),
using the linearity of the operator EL(·|·). Subtracting from (11) we obtain
L˜bt − EL(L˜bt|X˜bt) = β
(
P˜bt − EL(P˜bt|X˜bt)
)
+
(
e˜∗bt − EL(e˜∗bt|X˜bt)
)
.
Now, since P˜bt−EL(P˜bt|X˜bt) = u˜bt, provided EL(e˜bt, v˜bt, X˜bt|u˜bt) = 0, the slope of the best
linear predictor of L˜bt−EL(L˜bt|X˜bt) by (P˜bt−EL(P˜bt|X˜bt)) is β. Therefore, for identification
of β it suffices that the following unconditional moment conditions are satisfied:
E (e˜bt × u˜bt) = 0 (12)
E (v˜bt × u˜bt) = 0 (13)
E (Zbt × u˜bt) = 0. (14)
In practice, we construct the OLS estimator of β from (11) by the partitioned regression
formula
β̂ = (PᵀMxP)−1PᵀMxL = β + (PᵀMxP)−1PᵀMxE∗,
where P is the nT × 1 vector containing the observations P˜bt, L is the nT × 1 vector
containing the observations L˜bt, while
Mx = InT −X (X ᵀX )−1X ᵀ,
where X is the nT × k matrix containing the observations X˜bt. Here, E∗ is the nT × 1
vector containing the observations e˜∗bt. The partialling out by Mx removes the source of
correlation between the error term in (11) and the included variables.
The moment conditions (12) - (14), along with technical conditions (that are standard
in the difference-in-differences literature) to ensure laws of large numbers and central limit
theorems, guarantee the large sample approximations we use in the paper. The estimates
of d are not particularly meaningful as they involve a number of underlying parameters
(these estimates will be affected by the measurement error bias anyway).
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C Announcement effects: Full results
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Table 9: Announcement effects: Number of trades
Number of trades
(1) (2)
Eligible (indicator) 0.223 2.940∗
(0.843) (1.508)
Amount outstanding (GBP mn) 0.009∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Credit rating −0.207 −0.536
(0.263) (0.415)
Residual maturity (years) 0.401∗∗ 0.111
(0.180) (0.085)
Residual maturity squared (years) −0.006∗∗ −0.0001
(0.003) (0.0001)
Spread to reference government bond (bps) −0.010 −0.016
(0.008) (0.018)
Gilt amount outstanding (GBP mn) 0.00001
(0.00001)
Control group Sterling Euro
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 545 690
R2 0.085 0.153
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (1). The
variables and control groups are defined in Section 4. Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
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Table 10: Announcement effects: Trading volume (GBP mn)
Trading volume (GBP mn)
(1) (2)
Eligible (indicator) 0.860 4.515∗∗∗
(0.993) (1.519)
Amount outstanding (GBP mn) 0.012∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Credit rating −0.115 −0.224
(0.310) (0.418)
Residual maturity (years) 0.381∗ 0.046
(0.211) (0.086)
Residual maturity squared (years) −0.008∗∗ −0.00003
(0.004) (0.0001)
Spread to reference government bond (bps) 0.002 −0.005
(0.010) (0.018)
Gilt amount outstanding (GBP mn) 0.00000
(0.00001)
Control group Sterling Euro
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 545 690
R2 0.100 0.098
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (1). The
variables and control groups are defined in Section 4. Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
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Table 11: Announcement effects: Average trade size (GBP mn)
Average trade size (GBP mn)
(1) (2)
Eligible (indicator) −0.073 0.240∗
(0.173) (0.129)
Amount outstanding (GBP mn) −0.0002 0.0002
(0.0004) (0.0001)
Credit rating −0.051 −0.014
(0.053) (0.034)
Residual maturity (years) −0.011 −0.006
(0.037) (0.007)
Residual maturity squared (years) −0.00002 0.00001
(0.001) (0.00001)
Spread to reference government bond (bps) 0.0001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Gilt amount outstanding (GBP mn) −0.00000
(0.00000)
Control group Sterling Euro
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 316 505
R2 0.027 0.016
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (1). The
variables and control groups are defined in Section 4. Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
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Table 12: Announcement effects: Number of block trades
Number of block trades
(1) (2)
Eligible (indicator) 0.119 0.448∗∗
(0.150) (0.205)
Amount outstanding (GBP mn) 0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0002)
Credit rating −0.001 −0.007
(0.047) (0.056)
Residual maturity (years) 0.039 0.005
(0.032) (0.012)
Residual maturity squared (years) −0.001 −0.00000
(0.001) (0.00001)
Spread to reference government bond (bps) 0.00003 0.00001
(0.001) (0.002)
Gilt amount outstanding (GBP mn) −0.00000
(0.00000)
Control group Sterling Euro
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 545 690
R2 0.074 0.093
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (1). The
variables and control groups are defined in Section 4. Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
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Table 13: Announcement effects: Effective spread (bps)
Effective spread (bps)
(1) (2)
Eligible (indicator) 5.249 23.418∗∗∗
(10.636) (7.497)
Amount outstanding (GBP mn) −0.022 0.012∗
(0.020) (0.007)
Credit rating 1.028 −2.370
(3.187) (2.075)
Residual maturity (years) −0.385 −0.344
(2.048) (0.404)
Residual maturity squared (years) −0.014 0.0004
(0.031) (0.0004)
Spread to reference government bond (bps) 0.110 −0.006
(0.105) (0.087)
Gilt amount outstanding (GBP mn) −0.0001
(0.0001)
Control group Sterling Euro
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 136 213
R2 0.078 0.113
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (1). The
variables and control groups are defined in Section 4. Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
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Table 14: Announcement effects: Roll (bps)
Roll (bps)
(1) (2)
Eligible (indicator) 2.431 −8.237
(9.778) (6.333)
Amount outstanding (GBP mn) −0.049∗∗ −0.006
(0.020) (0.007)
Credit rating −3.941 −1.192
(2.746) (1.640)
Residual maturity (years) 2.587 0.335
(2.202) (0.448)
Residual maturity squared (years) −0.024 −0.0004
(0.033) (0.0004)
Spread to reference government bond (bps) −0.092 −0.026
(0.091) (0.074)
Gilt amount outstanding (GBP mn) 0.00004
(0.0001)
Control group Sterling Euro
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 154 287
R2 0.114 0.050
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (1). The
variables and control groups are defined in Section 4. Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
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Table 15: Announcement effects: Round-trip cost (bps)
Round-trip cost (bps)
(1) (2)
Eligible (indicator) 35.026∗ −13.335
(18.193) (9.802)
Amount outstanding (GBP mn) 0.020 −0.016∗
(0.036) (0.009)
Credit rating −4.068 −0.460
(4.323) (2.658)
Residual maturity (years) −1.941 −2.285∗∗∗
(3.164) (0.425)
Residual maturity squared (years) 0.014 0.002∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.0004)
Spread to reference government bond (bps) 0.274 0.424∗∗∗
(0.181) (0.124)
Gilt amount outstanding (GBP mn) 0.00004
(0.0001)
Control group Sterling Euro
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 52 94
R2 0.233 0.323
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (1). The
variables and control groups are defined in Section 4. Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
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Table 16: Announcement effects: Interquartile range (bps)
Interquartile range (bps)
(1) (2)
Eligible (indicator) 1.515 4.841
(7.299) (5.163)
Amount outstanding (GBP mn) −0.054∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗
(0.015) (0.005)
Credit rating −4.286∗∗ −2.984∗∗
(2.134) (1.360)
Residual maturity (years) 3.313∗∗ 0.255
(1.498) (0.296)
Residual maturity squared (years) −0.032 −0.0003
(0.024) (0.0003)
Spread to reference government bond (bps) −0.128∗ −0.009
(0.071) (0.061)
Gilt amount outstanding (GBP mn) 0.0001
(0.0001)
Control group Sterling Euro
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 249 421
R2 0.126 0.074
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (1). The
variables and control groups are defined in Section 4. Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
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Table 17: Announcement effects: Amihud (bps)
Amihud (bps)
(1) (2)
Eligible (indicator) −14.982 −15.670
(23.172) (15.281)
Amount outstanding (GBP mn) −0.061 −0.013
(0.045) (0.016)
Credit rating −2.993 −4.910
(6.832) (4.124)
Residual maturity (years) 5.545 2.956∗∗∗
(4.609) (0.940)
Residual maturity squared (years) −0.029 −0.003∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.001)
Spread to reference government bond (bps) −0.311 −0.256
(0.225) (0.177)
Gilt amount outstanding (GBP mn) 0.0002
(0.0002)
Control group Sterling Euro
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 226 355
R2 0.053 0.077
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (1). The
variables and control groups are defined in Section 4. Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
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Table 18: Announcement effects: Volatility-over-volume (bps)
Volatility-over-volume (bps)
(1) (2)
Eligible (indicator) −2.788 −6.002∗
(5.438) (3.581)
Amount outstanding (GBP mn) −0.030∗∗∗ −0.006∗
(0.011) (0.004)
Credit rating 0.459 −0.930
(1.527) (0.927)
Residual maturity (years) 1.676 0.302
(1.225) (0.253)
Residual maturity squared (years) −0.015 −0.0003
(0.018) (0.0002)
Spread to reference government bond (bps) −0.010 0.0003
(0.051) (0.042)
Gilt amount outstanding (GBP mn) 0.0001
(0.00005)
Control group Sterling Euro
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 154 287
R2 0.101 0.053
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (1). The
variables and control groups are defined in Section 4. Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
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D Impact of CBPS purchases on contemporaneous
liquidity: Full results
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Table 19: Impact of CBPS purchases on contemporaneous liquidity: Number of trades
Number of trades
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) 0.289∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.385∗∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.063) (0.065) (0.064)
Amount offered (GBP mn) 0.023 0.053∗
(0.022) (0.031)
Average offer spread (bps) 0.053∗ 0.129∗
(0.028) (0.071)
Reserve spread (bps) 0.010∗∗ −0.136∗
(0.004) (0.071)
Control group Offer Limit Sterling Euro
Bond fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auction fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of bonds 334 317 819 905
Number of auctions 81 81 82 82
Observations 4,275 2,601 14,637 16,579
R2 0.432 0.444 0.623 0.605
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (2). The
variables and control groups are defined in Section 5.2. Standard
errors are double-clustered at the bond and auction levels.
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Table 20: Impact of CBPS purchases on contemporaneous liquidity: Trading volume (GBP mn)
Trading volume (GBP mn)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) 0.739∗∗∗ 0.776∗∗∗ 0.978∗∗∗ 0.978∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.074) (0.068) (0.066)
Amount offered (GBP mn) 0.035 0.080∗∗
(0.033) (0.037)
Average offer spread (bps) 0.039 0.050
(0.043) (0.064)
Reserve spread (bps) 0.018∗∗ 0.117
(0.008) (0.092)
Control group Offer Limit Sterling Euro
Bond fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auction fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of bonds 334 317 819 905
Number of auctions 81 81 82 82
Observations 4,275 2,601 14,637 16,579
R2 0.309 0.371 0.396 0.469
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (2). The
variables and control groups are defined in Section 5.2. Standard
errors are double-clustered at the bond and auction levels.
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Table 21: Impact of CBPS purchases on contemporaneous liquidity: Average trade size (GBP mn)
Average trade size (GBP mn)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) 0.114∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.018) (0.021) (0.021)
Amount offered (GBP mn) −0.001 −0.002
(0.003) (0.005)
Average offer spread (bps) 0.017∗∗ −0.008
(0.007) (0.010)
Reserve spread (bps) 0.001 0.047∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.018)
Control group Offer Limit Sterling Euro
Bond fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auction fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of bonds 328 310 602 772
Number of auctions 81 81 82 82
Observations 3,929 2,425 6,615 12,287
R2 0.300 0.394 0.371 0.325
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (2). The
variables and control groups are defined in Section 5.2. Standard
errors are double-clustered at the bond and auction levels.
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Table 22: Impact of CBPS purchases on contemporaneous liquidity: Number of block trades
Number of block trades
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) 0.091∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009)
Amount offered (GBP mn) 0.006 0.013∗∗
(0.006) (0.005)
Average offer spread (bps) 0.008 0.010
(0.007) (0.009)
Reserve spread (bps) 0.002 0.006
(0.001) (0.016)
Control group Offer Limit Sterling Euro
Bond fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auction fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of bonds 334 317 819 905
Number of auctions 81 81 82 82
Observations 4,275 2,601 14,637 16,579
R2 0.237 0.289 0.321 0.398
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (2). The
variables and control groups are defined in Section 5.2. Standard
errors are double-clustered at the bond and auction levels.
65
Table 23: Impact of CBPS purchases on contemporaneous liquidity: Effective spread (bps)
Effective spread (bps)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) −0.854∗∗ −0.850∗ −0.950∗ −0.887∗
(0.373) (0.481) (0.552) (0.516)
Amount offered (GBP mn) 0.036 0.204
(0.146) (0.187)
Average offer spread (bps) 0.287 −0.539
(0.423) (0.651)
Reserve spread (bps) 0.007 0.518
(0.039) (0.892)
Control group Offer Limit Sterling Euro
Bond fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auction fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of bonds 298 275 523 714
Number of auctions 81 80 82 82
Observations 2,560 1,608 3,953 7,888
R2 0.212 0.275 0.249 0.219
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (2). The
variables and control groups are defined in Section 5.2. Standard
errors are double-clustered at the bond and auction levels.
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Table 24: Impact of CBPS purchases on contemporaneous liquidity: Roll (bps)
Roll (bps)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) −0.357∗ −0.693∗∗ −0.537 −0.407
(0.195) (0.344) (0.393) (0.387)
Amount offered (GBP mn) 0.050 0.195
(0.148) (0.183)
Average offer spread (bps) −0.254 0.458
(0.366) (0.583)
Reserve spread (bps) −0.035 −0.414
(0.040) (0.733)
Control group Offer Limit Sterling Euro
Bond fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auction fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of bonds 303 279 507 714
Number of auctions 81 80 82 82
Observations 2,645 1,651 4,013 9,258
R2 0.337 0.364 0.315 0.288
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (2). The
variables and control groups are defined in Section 5.2. Standard
errors are double-clustered at the bond and auction levels.
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Table 25: Impact of CBPS purchases on contemporaneous liquidity: Round-trip cost (bps)
Round-trip cost (bps)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) 0.097 −0.951 −0.469 −0.265
(0.424) (0.641) (0.406) (0.395)
Amount offered (GBP mn) −0.007 0.269
(0.198) (0.285)
Average offer spread (bps) 0.112 1.066
(0.439) (0.936)
Reserve spread (bps) 0.016 −1.799
(0.058) (1.123)
Control group Offer Limit Sterling Euro
Bond fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auction fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of bonds 271 232 461 655
Number of auctions 81 79 82 82
Observations 1,235 775 2,028 4,750
R2 0.578 0.665 0.574 0.520
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (2). The
variables and control groups are defined in Section 5.2. Standard
errors are double-clustered at the bond and auction levels.
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Table 26: Impact of CBPS purchases on contemporaneous liquidity: Interquartile range (bps)
Interquartile range (bps)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) 0.203 0.006 −0.042 0.342
(0.222) (0.351) (0.302) (0.325)
Amount offered (GBP mn) 0.059 0.174
(0.126) (0.178)
Average offer spread (bps) 0.227 0.210
(0.247) (0.462)
Reserve spread (bps) 0.002 −0.007
(0.025) (0.523)
Control group Offer Limit Sterling Euro
Bond fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auction fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of bonds 320 299 571 748
Number of auctions 81 81 82 82
Observations 3,527 2,182 5,641 11,316
R2 0.434 0.482 0.428 0.451
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (2). The
variables and control groups are defined in Section 5.2. Standard
errors are double-clustered at the bond and auction levels.
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Table 27: Impact of CBPS purchases on contemporaneous liquidity: Amihud (bps)
Amihud (bps)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) −0.828∗ −2.080∗∗∗ −2.742∗∗∗ −2.301∗∗∗
(0.491) (0.617) (0.740) (0.719)
Amount offered (GBP mn) −0.387∗ −0.250
(0.219) (0.243)
Average offer spread (bps) 0.079 1.145
(0.521) (0.960)
Reserve spread (bps) −0.102 −1.156
(0.071) (1.391)
Control group Offer Limit Sterling Euro
Bond fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auction fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of bonds 318 296 562 741
Number of auctions 81 80 82 82
Observations 3,340 2,081 5,283 10,147
R2 0.286 0.327 0.288 0.297
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (2). The
variables and control groups are defined in Section 5.2. Standard
errors are double-clustered at the bond and auction levels.
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Table 28: Impact of CBPS purchases on contemporaneous liquidity: Volatility-over-volume (bps)
Volatility-over-volume (bps)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) −0.684∗∗∗ −0.877∗∗∗ −0.941∗∗∗ −0.847∗∗∗
(0.122) (0.152) (0.136) (0.156)
Amount offered (GBP mn) 0.015 0.020
(0.070) (0.085)
Average offer spread (bps) −0.054 0.106
(0.212) (0.286)
Reserve spread (bps) −0.009 −0.801∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.308)
Control group Offer Limit Sterling Euro
Bond fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auction fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of bonds 303 279 507 714
Number of auctions 81 80 82 82
Observations 2,645 1,651 4,013 9,258
R2 0.501 0.566 0.570 0.510
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (2). The
variables and control groups are defined in Section 5.2. Standard
errors are double-clustered at the bond and auction levels.
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E Heterogeneity of impact by pre-CBPS liquidity:
Full results
72
Table 29: Heterogeneity of impact by pre-CBPS liquidity: Number of trades
Number of trades
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) 0.299∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.060) (0.069) (0.078)
Amount purchased x Pre-CBPS liquidity −0.004 −0.005 0.006 0.005
(0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Amount offered (GBP mn) 0.023 0.051∗∗
(0.018) (0.025)
Amount offered x Pre-CBPS liquidity 0.0004 0.001
(0.004) (0.005)
Average offer spread (bps) 0.033 0.084
(0.026) (0.068)
Average offer spread x Pre-CBPS liquidity −0.0002 0.001
(0.001) (0.002)
Reserve spread (bps) 0.009∗∗ −0.151∗∗
(0.004) (0.062)
Reserve spread x Pre-CBPS liquidity −0.0001 −0.006
(0.001) (0.006)
Control group Offer Limit Sterling Euro
Bond fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auction fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of bonds 310 293 751 810
Number of auctions 81 81 82 82
Observations 3,947 2,425 13,964 15,345
R2 0.368 0.387 0.618 0.607
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (3). The
variables and control groups are defined in Sections 5.2 and 5.5.
Standard errors are double-clustered at the bond and auction levels.
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Table 30: Heterogeneity of impact by pre-CBPS liquidity: Trading volume (GBP mn)
Trading volume (GBP mn)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) 0.772∗∗∗ 0.797∗∗∗ 0.965∗∗∗ 0.980∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.077) (0.080) (0.068)
Amount purchased x Pre-CBPS liquidity 0.0003 −0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Amount offered (GBP mn) 0.038 0.088∗∗
(0.031) (0.034)
Amount offered x Pre-CBPS liquidity −0.005∗∗∗ −0.005∗
(0.001) (0.003)
Average offer spread (bps) 0.017 0.011
(0.041) (0.064)
Average offer spread x Pre-CBPS liquidity −0.002 0.0002
(0.002) (0.003)
Reserve spread (bps) 0.016∗∗ 0.067
(0.007) (0.093)
Reserve spread x Pre-CBPS liquidity 0.001 −0.010
(0.001) (0.007)
Control group Offer Limit Sterling Euro
Bond fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auction fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of bonds 310 293 751 810
Number of auctions 81 81 82 82
Observations 3,947 2,425 13,964 15,345
R2 0.299 0.357 0.386 0.418
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (3). The
variables and control groups are defined in Sections 5.2 and 5.5.
Standard errors are double-clustered at the bond and auction levels.
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Table 31: Heterogeneity of impact by pre-CBPS liquidity: Average trade size (GBP mn)
Average trade size (GBP mn)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) 0.120∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022)
Amount purchased x Pre-CBPS liquidity 0.012 0.016 −0.004 −0.006
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
Amount offered (GBP mn) −0.0004 0.002
(0.004) (0.005)
Amount offered x Pre-CBPS liquidity 0.0004 −0.001
(0.003) (0.004)
Average offer spread (bps) 0.015∗∗ −0.003
(0.007) (0.011)
Average offer spread x Pre-CBPS liquidity −0.016∗ −0.022∗
(0.009) (0.012)
Reserve spread (bps) 0.001 0.034∗
(0.001) (0.020)
Reserve spread x Pre-CBPS liquidity 0.001 0.012
(0.001) (0.011)
Control group Offer Limit Sterling Euro
Bond fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auction fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of bonds 237 226 397 607
Number of auctions 81 81 82 82
Observations 3,154 1,951 5,029 10,792
R2 0.294 0.395 0.360 0.304
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (3). The
variables and control groups are defined in Sections 5.2 and 5.5.
Standard errors are double-clustered at the bond and auction levels.
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Table 32: Heterogeneity of impact by pre-CBPS liquidity: Number of block trades
Number of block trades
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) 0.094∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009)
Amount purchased x Pre-CBPS liquidity −0.001 −0.003 0.004 0.003
(0.011) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005)
Amount offered (GBP mn) 0.005 0.013∗∗
(0.005) (0.006)
Amount offered x Pre-CBPS liquidity −0.003∗ −0.003
(0.002) (0.002)
Average offer spread (bps) 0.006 0.005
(0.007) (0.009)
Average offer spread x Pre-CBPS liquidity −0.004 −0.004
(0.005) (0.006)
Reserve spread (bps) 0.002 −0.001
(0.001) (0.016)
Reserve spread x Pre-CBPS liquidity −0.001 −0.011
(0.001) (0.008)
Control group Offer Limit Sterling Euro
Bond fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auction fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of bonds 310 293 751 810
Number of auctions 81 81 82 82
Observations 3,947 2,425 13,964 15,345
R2 0.231 0.273 0.315 0.323
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (3). The
variables and control groups are defined in Sections 5.2 and 5.5.
Standard errors are double-clustered at the bond and auction levels.
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Table 33: Heterogeneity of impact by pre-CBPS liquidity: Effective spread (bps)
Effective spread (bps)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) −1.274∗∗ −0.796 −1.532∗∗ −1.102∗
(0.502) (0.624) (0.612) (0.599)
Amount purchased x Pre-CBPS liquidity −0.019∗ −0.009 −0.016 −0.017
(0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Amount offered (GBP mn) 0.096 0.033
(0.156) (0.206)
Amount offered x Pre-CBPS liquidity 0.002 −0.002
(0.004) (0.006)
Average offer spread (bps) 0.430 −1.371∗
(0.515) (0.734)
Average offer spread x Pre-CBPS liquidity 0.006 −0.027
(0.016) (0.023)
Reserve spread (bps) −0.003 1.921
(0.054) (1.304)
Reserve spread x Pre-CBPS liquidity −0.001 0.029
(0.001) (0.022)
Control group Offer Limit Sterling Euro
Bond fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auction fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of bonds 123 117 208 369
Number of auctions 81 78 82 82
Observations 1,337 842 2,165 5,127
R2 0.216 0.307 0.213 0.216
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (3). The
variables and control groups are defined in Sections 5.2 and 5.5.
Standard errors are double-clustered at the bond and auction levels.
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Table 34: Heterogeneity of impact by pre-CBPS liquidity: Roll (bps)
Roll (bps)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) −0.515∗ −0.900∗ −0.510 −0.423
(0.297) (0.484) (0.498) (0.536)
Amount purchased x Pre-CBPS liquidity 0.004 0.008 −0.001 0.002
(0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
Amount offered (GBP mn) 0.204 0.200
(0.207) (0.283)
Amount offered x Pre-CBPS liquidity 0.004 0.001
(0.005) (0.006)
Average offer spread (bps) −0.062 0.819
(0.451) (0.659)
Average offer spread x Pre-CBPS liquidity 0.005 0.003
(0.013) (0.017)
Reserve spread (bps) −0.011 −0.368
(0.045) (0.986)
Reserve spread x Pre-CBPS liquidity −0.0004 0.007
(0.001) (0.008)
Control group Offer Limit Sterling Euro
Bond fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auction fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of bonds 134 126 219 421
Number of auctions 81 78 82 82
Observations 1,527 945 2,386 6,966
R2 0.359 0.382 0.316 0.286
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (3). The
variables and control groups are defined in Sections 5.2 and 5.5.
Standard errors are double-clustered at the bond and auction levels.
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Table 35: Heterogeneity of impact by pre-CBPS liquidity: Round-trip cost (bps)
Round-trip cost (bps)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) −0.438 −1.396 −0.398 −0.404
(0.693) (1.324) (0.446) (0.451)
Amount purchased x Pre-CBPS liquidity 0.011 −0.002 −0.010 −0.006
(0.012) (0.024) (0.015) (0.016)
Amount offered (GBP mn) 0.182 0.393
(0.322) (0.450)
Amount offered x Pre-CBPS liquidity −0.010 −0.006
(0.008) (0.014)
Average offer spread (bps) 0.277 2.039∗
(0.876) (1.135)
Average offer spread x Pre-CBPS liquidity 0.018 0.053
(0.019) (0.046)
Reserve spread (bps) 0.097 −2.018
(0.070) (1.554)
Reserve spread x Pre-CBPS liquidity −0.001 −0.035∗∗
(0.001) (0.014)
Control group Offer Limit Sterling Euro
Bond fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auction fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of bonds 57 50 98 220
Number of auctions 74 66 82 82
Observations 346 210 727 2,380
R2 0.586 0.761 0.520 0.475
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (3). The
variables and control groups are defined in Sections 5.2 and 5.5.
Standard errors are double-clustered at the bond and auction levels.
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Table 36: Heterogeneity of impact by pre-CBPS liquidity: Interquartile range (bps)
Interquartile range (bps)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) 0.173 −0.141 −0.067 0.432
(0.278) (0.404) (0.291) (0.345)
Amount purchased x Pre-CBPS liquidity 0.004 0.0004 0.003 −0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
Amount offered (GBP mn) −0.044 0.172
(0.126) (0.161)
Amount offered x Pre-CBPS liquidity 0.004∗ 0.002
(0.003) (0.004)
Average offer spread (bps) 0.355 0.478
(0.278) (0.538)
Average offer spread x Pre-CBPS liquidity −0.005 0.001
(0.007) (0.011)
Reserve spread (bps) −0.001 −0.396
(0.027) (0.532)
Reserve spread x Pre-CBPS liquidity 0.0002 −0.014∗
(0.001) (0.008)
Control group Offer Limit Sterling Euro
Bond fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auction fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of bonds 198 188 332 538
Number of auctions 81 81 82 82
Observations 2,562 1,587 3,959 9,374
R2 0.443 0.490 0.444 0.452
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (3). The
variables and control groups are defined in Sections 5.2 and 5.5.
Standard errors are double-clustered at the bond and auction levels.
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Table 37: Heterogeneity of impact by pre-CBPS liquidity: Amihud (bps)
Amihud (bps)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) −0.376 −2.062∗∗∗ −3.143∗∗∗ −1.930∗∗
(0.515) (0.785) (0.880) (0.782)
Amount purchased x Pre-CBPS liquidity −0.004 −0.002 −0.014 −0.017
(0.006) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013)
Amount offered (GBP mn) −0.490∗∗ −0.054
(0.235) (0.326)
Amount offered x Pre-CBPS liquidity 0.001 −0.003
(0.003) (0.003)
Average offer spread (bps) −0.349 0.985
(0.673) (1.238)
Average offer spread x Pre-CBPS liquidity −0.014∗ −0.016
(0.007) (0.011)
Reserve spread (bps) −0.092 −2.497
(0.070) (1.736)
Reserve spread x Pre-CBPS liquidity −0.0005 0.006
(0.0005) (0.015)
Control group Offer Limit Sterling Euro
Bond fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auction fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of bonds 175 168 300 486
Number of auctions 81 80 82 82
Observations 2,280 1,411 3,537 7,877
R2 0.293 0.347 0.279 0.295
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (3). The
variables and control groups are defined in Sections 5.2 and 5.5.
Standard errors are double-clustered at the bond and auction levels.
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Table 38: Heterogeneity of impact by pre-CBPS liquidity: Volatility-over-volume (bps)
Volatility-over-volume (bps)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) −0.796∗∗∗ −1.038∗∗∗ −0.780∗∗∗ −0.529∗∗∗
(0.161) (0.226) (0.158) (0.124)
Amount purchased x Pre-CBPS liquidity −0.004 −0.005 −0.009 −0.012
(0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
Amount offered (GBP mn) 0.049 0.086
(0.100) (0.121)
Amount offered x Pre-CBPS liquidity −0.007∗ −0.007∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Average offer spread (bps) 0.394 0.577
(0.247) (0.393)
Average offer spread x Pre-CBPS liquidity 0.018 0.017
(0.014) (0.021)
Reserve spread (bps) −0.003 −1.010∗∗
(0.026) (0.438)
Reserve spread x Pre-CBPS liquidity −0.001 −0.005
(0.001) (0.008)
Control group Offer Limit Sterling Euro
Bond fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auction fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of bonds 134 126 219 421
Number of auctions 81 78 82 82
Observations 1,527 945 2,386 6,966
R2 0.522 0.601 0.606 0.522
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (3). The
variables and control groups are defined in Sections 5.2 and 5.5.
Standard errors are double-clustered at the bond and auction levels.
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F Variation in contemporaneous impact over time:
Full results
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Table 39: Variation in contemporaneous impact over time: Number of trades
Number of trades
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) 0.266∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.059) (0.055) (0.055)
Amount purchased x Trend −0.009∗ −0.006 −0.010∗ −0.009
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Amount offered (GBP mn) 0.015 0.047
(0.024) (0.038)
Amount offered x Trend −0.001 −0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Average offer spread (bps) 0.057∗∗ 0.177∗∗
(0.029) (0.070)
Average offer spread x Trend 0.002 0.009
(0.002) (0.006)
Reserve spread (bps) 0.014∗∗ −0.149
(0.007) (0.094)
Reserve spread x Trend −0.001 −0.005
(0.001) (0.007)
Control group Offer Limit Sterling Euro
Bond fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auction fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of bonds 334 317 819 905
Number of auctions 81 81 82 82
Observations 4,275 2,601 14,637 16,579
R2 0.433 0.444 0.624 0.605
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (4). The
variables and control groups are defined in Sections 5.2 and 5.5.
Standard errors are double-clustered at the bond and auction levels.
84
Table 40: Variation in contemporaneous impact over time: Trading volume (GBP mn)
Trading volume (GBP mn)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) 0.682∗∗∗ 0.694∗∗∗ 0.899∗∗∗ 0.899∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.076) (0.066) (0.066)
Amount purchased x Trend −0.022∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Amount offered (GBP mn) 0.035 0.098∗∗
(0.036) (0.045)
Amount offered x Trend 0.001 0.003
(0.003) (0.003)
Average offer spread (bps) 0.036 0.095
(0.051) (0.081)
Average offer spread x Trend 0.002 0.012∗
(0.002) (0.007)
Reserve spread (bps) 0.031∗∗ 0.128
(0.013) (0.136)
Reserve spread x Trend −0.002∗ −0.007
(0.001) (0.011)
Control group Offer Limit Sterling Euro
Bond fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auction fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of bonds 334 317 819 905
Number of auctions 81 81 82 82
Observations 4,275 2,601 14,637 16,579
R2 0.313 0.374 0.397 0.469
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (4). The
variables and control groups are defined in Sections 5.2 and 5.5.
Standard errors are double-clustered at the bond and auction levels.
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Table 41: Variation in contemporaneous impact over time: Average trade size (GBP mn)
Average trade size (GBP mn)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) 0.103∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.017) (0.020) (0.019)
Amount purchased x Trend −0.004∗∗∗ −0.003∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Amount offered (GBP mn) −0.0003 −0.001
(0.004) (0.006)
Amount offered x Trend 0.0004 0.0004
(0.0003) (0.0005)
Average offer spread (bps) 0.012 −0.031∗
(0.010) (0.017)
Average offer spread x Trend −0.001 −0.002
(0.001) (0.002)
Reserve spread (bps) 0.004∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.027)
Reserve spread x Trend −0.0004∗∗ 0.003
(0.0002) (0.002)
Control group Offer Limit Sterling Euro
Bond fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auction fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of bonds 328 310 602 772
Number of auctions 81 81 82 82
Observations 3,929 2,425 6,615 12,287
R2 0.307 0.400 0.374 0.327
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (4). The
variables and control groups are defined in Sections 5.2 and 5.5.
Standard errors are double-clustered at the bond and auction levels.
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Table 42: Variation in contemporaneous impact over time: Number of block trades
Number of block trades
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) 0.085∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009)
Amount purchased x Trend −0.002∗∗ −0.003∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Amount offered (GBP mn) 0.005 0.016∗∗
(0.006) (0.006)
Amount offered x Trend 0.0001 0.0004
(0.0005) (0.0005)
Average offer spread (bps) 0.007 0.012
(0.008) (0.013)
Average offer spread x Trend 0.0001 0.001
(0.0003) (0.001)
Reserve spread (bps) 0.004∗ 0.007
(0.002) (0.024)
Reserve spread x Trend −0.0003 −0.001
(0.0002) (0.002)
Control group Offer Limit Sterling Euro
Bond fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auction fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of bonds 334 317 819 905
Number of auctions 81 81 82 82
Observations 4,275 2,601 14,637 16,579
R2 0.239 0.291 0.322 0.398
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (4). The
variables and control groups are defined in Sections 5.2 and 5.5.
Standard errors are double-clustered at the bond and auction levels.
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Table 43: Variation in contemporaneous impact over time: Effective spread (bps)
Effective spread (bps)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) −0.556 −0.573 −0.757 −0.867∗
(0.361) (0.504) (0.509) (0.491)
Amount purchased x Trend 0.048 0.056 0.041 0.004
(0.040) (0.060) (0.045) (0.039)
Amount offered (GBP mn) −0.140 0.015
(0.139) (0.222)
Amount offered x Trend −0.029∗∗ −0.027
(0.012) (0.017)
Average offer spread (bps) 0.362 −0.200
(0.421) (0.746)
Average offer spread x Trend 0.035 0.034
(0.038) (0.078)
Reserve spread (bps) 0.109 −0.053
(0.070) (0.914)
Reserve spread x Trend −0.015∗ −0.050
(0.008) (0.092)
Control group Offer Limit Sterling Euro
Bond fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auction fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of bonds 298 275 523 714
Number of auctions 81 80 82 82
Observations 2,560 1,608 3,953 7,888
R2 0.217 0.278 0.250 0.219
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (4). The
variables and control groups are defined in Sections 5.2 and 5.5.
Standard errors are double-clustered at the bond and auction levels.
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Table 44: Variation in contemporaneous impact over time: Roll (bps)
Roll (bps)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) −0.332 −1.248∗∗∗ −0.528 −0.607
(0.216) (0.395) (0.383) (0.382)
Amount purchased x Trend −0.005 −0.082∗ 0.002 −0.044∗∗
(0.024) (0.045) (0.027) (0.022)
Amount offered (GBP mn) 0.098 0.599∗∗∗
(0.146) (0.199)
Amount offered x Trend 0.011 0.051∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.017)
Average offer spread (bps) −0.207 1.263∗
(0.384) (0.749)
Average offer spread x Trend 0.016 0.098
(0.035) (0.069)
Reserve spread (bps) 0.017 −1.416∗
(0.070) (0.763)
Reserve spread x Trend −0.008 −0.124∗
(0.008) (0.065)
Control group Offer Limit Sterling Euro
Bond fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auction fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of bonds 303 279 507 714
Number of auctions 81 80 82 82
Observations 2,645 1,651 4,013 9,258
R2 0.337 0.369 0.315 0.288
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (4). The
variables and control groups are defined in Sections 5.2 and 5.5.
Standard errors are double-clustered at the bond and auction levels.
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Table 45: Variation in contemporaneous impact over time: Round-trip cost (bps)
Round-trip cost (bps)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) 0.021 −0.505 −0.757 −0.892∗∗
(0.423) (0.746) (0.487) (0.438)
Amount purchased x Trend 0.009 0.077 −0.064 −0.140∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.068) (0.047) (0.041)
Amount offered (GBP mn) −0.137 −0.069
(0.178) (0.370)
Amount offered x Trend −0.028∗∗ −0.045∗
(0.012) (0.024)
Average offer spread (bps) 0.209 1.184
(0.482) (1.160)
Average offer spread x Trend 0.011 0.026
(0.042) (0.116)
Reserve spread (bps) −0.046 −0.412
(0.052) (1.526)
Reserve spread x Trend 0.015 0.176
(0.010) (0.122)
Control group Offer Limit Sterling Euro
Bond fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auction fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of bonds 271 232 461 655
Number of auctions 81 79 82 82
Observations 1,235 775 2,028 4,750
R2 0.582 0.672 0.575 0.525
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (4). The
variables and control groups are defined in Sections 5.2 and 5.5.
Standard errors are double-clustered at the bond and auction levels.
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Table 46: Variation in contemporaneous impact over time: Interquartile range (bps)
Interquartile range (bps)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) 0.212 0.006 −0.219 −0.269
(0.233) (0.367) (0.309) (0.355)
Amount purchased x Trend −0.001 −0.027 −0.039 −0.132∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.031) (0.025) (0.029)
Amount offered (GBP mn) −0.107 0.011
(0.120) (0.201)
Amount offered x Trend −0.030∗∗ −0.019
(0.012) (0.018)
Average offer spread (bps) 0.230 0.032
(0.253) (0.529)
Average offer spread x Trend 0.006 0.010
(0.026) (0.050)
Reserve spread (bps) −0.010 1.241∗∗
(0.047) (0.629)
Reserve spread x Trend 0.002 0.129∗∗
(0.006) (0.054)
Control group Offer Limit Sterling Euro
Bond fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auction fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of bonds 320 299 571 748
Number of auctions 81 81 82 82
Observations 3,527 2,182 5,641 11,316
R2 0.437 0.487 0.428 0.456
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (4). The
variables and control groups are defined in Sections 5.2 and 5.5.
Standard errors are double-clustered at the bond and auction levels.
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Table 47: Variation in contemporaneous impact over time: Amihud (bps)
Amihud (bps)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) −0.776 −2.171∗∗∗ −2.488∗∗∗ −2.760∗∗∗
(0.540) (0.626) (0.760) (0.745)
Amount purchased x Trend 0.029 −0.034 0.057 −0.099∗
(0.063) (0.076) (0.062) (0.060)
Amount offered (GBP mn) −0.420∗ −0.314
(0.231) (0.329)
Amount offered x Trend −0.008 −0.007
(0.019) (0.026)
Average offer spread (bps) 0.013 1.087
(0.660) (1.059)
Average offer spread x Trend −0.021 0.010
(0.052) (0.093)
Reserve spread (bps) −0.153 −0.759
(0.115) (1.472)
Reserve spread x Trend 0.008 0.030
(0.015) (0.136)
Control group Offer Limit Sterling Euro
Bond fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auction fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of bonds 318 296 562 741
Number of auctions 81 80 82 82
Observations 3,340 2,081 5,283 10,147
R2 0.286 0.327 0.288 0.298
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (4). The
variables and control groups are defined in Sections 5.2 and 5.5.
Standard errors are double-clustered at the bond and auction levels.
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Table 48: Variation in contemporaneous impact over time: Volatility-over-volume (bps)
Volatility-over-volume (bps)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) −0.569∗∗∗ −0.771∗∗∗ −0.889∗∗∗ −0.983∗∗∗
(0.123) (0.160) (0.129) (0.164)
Amount purchased x Trend 0.029∗ 0.011 0.012 −0.030∗∗
(0.015) (0.017) (0.010) (0.015)
Amount offered (GBP mn) −0.057 −0.082
(0.059) (0.063)
Amount offered x Trend −0.013∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005)
Average offer spread (bps) −0.069 0.152
(0.245) (0.337)
Average offer spread x Trend −0.003 0.013
(0.021) (0.029)
Reserve spread (bps) −0.006 −0.440
(0.031) (0.437)
Reserve spread x Trend 0.0004 0.038
(0.005) (0.032)
Control group Offer Limit Sterling Euro
Bond fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auction fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of bonds 303 279 507 714
Number of auctions 81 80 82 82
Observations 2,645 1,651 4,013 9,258
R2 0.503 0.568 0.570 0.511
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (4). The
variables and control groups are defined in Sections 5.2 and 5.5.
Standard errors are double-clustered at the bond and auction levels.
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G Impact of lagged CBPS purchases on liquidity:
Full results
94
Table 49: Impact of lagged CBPS purchases on liquidity: Number of trades
Number of trades
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) 0.289∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.385∗∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.062) (0.065) (0.063)
Lagged amount purchased (GBP mn) 0.053 0.058 0.031 0.037
(0.046) (0.059) (0.051) (0.052)
Amount offered (GBP mn) 0.022 0.053∗
(0.021) (0.031)
Average offer spread (bps) 0.052∗ 0.128∗
(0.028) (0.070)
Reserve spread (bps) 0.010∗∗ −0.131∗
(0.004) (0.070)
Control group Offer Limit Sterling Euro
Bond fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auction fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of bonds 334 317 819 905
Number of auctions 81 81 82 82
Observations 4,275 2,601 14,637 16,579
R2 0.432 0.444 0.623 0.605
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (5). The
variables and control groups are defined in Sections 5.2 and 6.1.
Standard errors are double-clustered at the bond and auction levels.
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Table 50: Impact of lagged CBPS purchases on liquidity: Trading volume (GBP mn)
Trading volume (GBP mn)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) 0.739∗∗∗ 0.779∗∗∗ 0.979∗∗∗ 0.978∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.073) (0.068) (0.066)
Lagged amount purchased (GBP mn) 0.068 0.075 0.037 0.042
(0.070) (0.071) (0.074) (0.073)
Amount offered (GBP mn) 0.034 0.079∗∗
(0.033) (0.036)
Average offer spread (bps) 0.037 0.049
(0.043) (0.064)
Reserve spread (bps) 0.019∗∗ 0.124
(0.008) (0.092)
Control group Offer Limit Sterling Euro
Bond fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auction fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of bonds 334 317 819 905
Number of auctions 81 81 82 82
Observations 4,275 2,601 14,637 16,579
R2 0.310 0.371 0.396 0.469
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (5). The
variables and control groups are defined in Sections 5.2 and 6.1.
Standard errors are double-clustered at the bond and auction levels.
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Table 51: Impact of lagged CBPS purchases on liquidity: Average trade size (GBP mn)
Average trade size (GBP mn)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) 0.114∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.018) (0.021) (0.021)
Lagged amount purchased (GBP mn) 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.009
(0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
Amount offered (GBP mn) −0.001 −0.002
(0.003) (0.005)
Average offer spread (bps) 0.017∗∗ −0.008
(0.007) (0.010)
Reserve spread (bps) 0.001 0.047∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.018)
Control group Offer Limit Sterling Euro
Bond fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auction fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of bonds 328 310 602 772
Number of auctions 81 81 82 82
Observations 3,929 2,425 6,615 12,287
R2 0.300 0.394 0.371 0.325
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (5). The
variables and control groups are defined in Sections 5.2 and 6.1.
Standard errors are double-clustered at the bond and auction levels.
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Table 52: Impact of lagged CBPS purchases on liquidity: Number of block trades
Number of block trades
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) 0.091∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009)
Lagged amount purchased (GBP mn) 0.011 0.011 0.003 0.004
(0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
Amount offered (GBP mn) 0.005 0.013∗∗
(0.006) (0.005)
Average offer spread (bps) 0.008 0.010
(0.007) (0.009)
Reserve spread (bps) 0.002 0.008
(0.001) (0.015)
Control group Offer Limit Sterling Euro
Bond fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auction fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of bonds 334 317 819 905
Number of auctions 81 81 82 82
Observations 4,275 2,601 14,637 16,579
R2 0.238 0.290 0.321 0.398
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (5). The
variables and control groups are defined in Sections 5.2 and 6.1.
Standard errors are double-clustered at the bond and auction levels.
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Table 53: Impact of lagged CBPS purchases on liquidity: Effective spread (bps)
Effective spread (bps)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) −0.855∗∗ −0.852∗ −0.948∗ −0.887∗
(0.373) (0.482) (0.551) (0.515)
Lagged amount purchased (GBP mn) 0.110 −0.043 −0.149 −0.064
(0.290) (0.418) (0.383) (0.398)
Amount offered (GBP mn) 0.034 0.205
(0.144) (0.187)
Average offer spread (bps) 0.285 −0.538
(0.421) (0.649)
Reserve spread (bps) 0.008 0.513
(0.039) (0.893)
Control group Offer Limit Sterling Euro
Bond fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auction fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of bonds 298 275 523 714
Number of auctions 81 80 82 82
Observations 2,560 1,608 3,953 7,888
R2 0.212 0.275 0.249 0.219
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (5). The
variables and control groups are defined in Sections 5.2 and 6.1.
Standard errors are double-clustered at the bond and auction levels.
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Table 54: Impact of lagged CBPS purchases on liquidity: Roll (bps)
Roll (bps)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) −0.357∗ −0.664∗ −0.533 −0.402
(0.195) (0.348) (0.394) (0.388)
Lagged amount purchased (GBP mn) 0.502 0.554 0.403 0.610
(0.309) (0.390) (0.434) (0.397)
Amount offered (GBP mn) 0.041 0.185
(0.149) (0.187)
Average offer spread (bps) −0.254 0.452
(0.365) (0.585)
Reserve spread (bps) −0.031 −0.352
(0.040) (0.744)
Control group Offer Limit Sterling Euro
Bond fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auction fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of bonds 303 279 507 714
Number of auctions 81 80 82 82
Observations 2,645 1,651 4,013 9,258
R2 0.338 0.365 0.315 0.288
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (5). The
variables and control groups are defined in Sections 5.2 and 6.1.
Standard errors are double-clustered at the bond and auction levels.
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Table 55: Impact of lagged CBPS purchases on liquidity: Round-trip cost (bps)
Round-trip cost (bps)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) 0.102 −0.931 −0.498 −0.299
(0.429) (0.637) (0.403) (0.391)
Lagged amount purchased (GBP mn) 0.226 0.371 0.778 0.921∗
(0.350) (0.503) (0.502) (0.485)
Amount offered (GBP mn) −0.013 0.256
(0.196) (0.281)
Average offer spread (bps) 0.098 1.030
(0.442) (0.944)
Reserve spread (bps) 0.017 −1.766
(0.057) (1.119)
Control group Offer Limit Sterling Euro
Bond fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auction fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of bonds 271 232 461 655
Number of auctions 81 79 82 82
Observations 1,235 775 2,028 4,750
R2 0.578 0.666 0.575 0.521
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (5). The
variables and control groups are defined in Sections 5.2 and 6.1.
Standard errors are double-clustered at the bond and auction levels.
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Table 56: Impact of lagged CBPS purchases on liquidity: Interquartile range (bps)
Interquartile range (bps)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) 0.204 0.003 −0.042 0.345
(0.222) (0.352) (0.303) (0.326)
Lagged amount purchased (GBP mn) −0.020 −0.079 0.066 0.281
(0.247) (0.320) (0.400) (0.450)
Amount offered (GBP mn) 0.060 0.175
(0.126) (0.178)
Average offer spread (bps) 0.228 0.210
(0.248) (0.462)
Reserve spread (bps) 0.002 −0.015
(0.025) (0.523)
Control group Offer Limit Sterling Euro
Bond fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auction fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of bonds 320 299 571 748
Number of auctions 81 81 82 82
Observations 3,527 2,182 5,641 11,316
R2 0.434 0.482 0.428 0.451
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (5). The
variables and control groups are defined in Sections 5.2 and 6.1.
Standard errors are double-clustered at the bond and auction levels.
102
Table 57: Impact of lagged CBPS purchases on liquidity: Amihud (bps)
Amihud (bps)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) −0.828∗ −2.114∗∗∗ −2.758∗∗∗ −2.312∗∗∗
(0.491) (0.615) (0.733) (0.714)
Lagged amount purchased (GBP mn) −0.132 −0.860 −1.274∗ −0.975
(0.500) (0.624) (0.683) (0.667)
Amount offered (GBP mn) −0.385∗ −0.236
(0.217) (0.237)
Average offer spread (bps) 0.081 1.164
(0.523) (0.956)
Reserve spread (bps) −0.103 −1.252
(0.071) (1.383)
Control group Offer Limit Sterling Euro
Bond fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auction fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of bonds 318 296 562 741
Number of auctions 81 80 82 82
Observations 3,340 2,081 5,283 10,147
R2 0.286 0.327 0.289 0.298
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (5). The
variables and control groups are defined in Sections 5.2 and 6.1.
Standard errors are double-clustered at the bond and auction levels.
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Table 58: Impact of lagged CBPS purchases on liquidity: Volatility-over-volume (bps)
Volatility-over-volume (bps)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) −0.684∗∗∗ −0.869∗∗∗ −0.937∗∗∗ −0.843∗∗∗
(0.122) (0.149) (0.140) (0.160)
Lagged amount purchased (GBP mn) 0.197 0.159 0.360∗ 0.436∗∗
(0.163) (0.157) (0.204) (0.221)
Amount offered (GBP mn) 0.012 0.018
(0.069) (0.085)
Average offer spread (bps) −0.054 0.105
(0.212) (0.287)
Reserve spread (bps) −0.007 −0.783∗∗
(0.023) (0.304)
Control group Offer Limit Sterling Euro
Bond fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auction fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of bonds 303 279 507 714
Number of auctions 81 80 82 82
Observations 2,645 1,651 4,013 9,258
R2 0.501 0.566 0.570 0.511
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (5). The
variables and control groups are defined in Sections 5.2 and 6.1.
Standard errors are double-clustered at the bond and auction levels.
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H Stock effects: Full results
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Table 59: Stock effects: Number of trades
Number of trades
(1) (2)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) 0.008 (0.031) −0.006 (0.023)
Amount outstanding (GBP mn) −0.001 (0.003) −0.001 (0.002)
Credit rating −0.160 (0.389) 0.201 (0.284)
Residual maturity (years) 0.338 (0.342) 0.293 (0.192)
Residual maturity squared (years) −0.005 (0.007) −0.006∗ (0.003)
Spread to reference gilt (bps) −0.021 (0.016) −0.009 (0.009)
Gilt amount outstanding (GBP mn) 0.00001 (0.00001) 0.00001 (0.00001)
Change in credit rating 4.651∗∗∗ (1.306) 4.028∗∗∗ (0.960)
Change in gilt amount outstanding (GBP mn) −0.00003 (0.0001) −0.00004 (0.00004)
Gilt QE purchases (GBP mn) −0.0001 (0.0001) −0.0001 (0.0001)
Control group Eligible Sterling
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 311 493
R2 0.094 0.093
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (6). The
variables and control groups are defined in Section 6.2. Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
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Table 60: Stock effects: Trading volume (GBP mn)
Trading volume (GBP mn)
(1) (2)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) −0.040 (0.032) −0.067∗∗∗ (0.025)
Amount outstanding (GBP mn) 0.001 (0.003) 0.002 (0.002)
Credit rating −0.288 (0.393) −0.010 (0.303)
Residual maturity (years) 0.189 (0.346) 0.167 (0.205)
Residual maturity squared (years) −0.002 (0.007) −0.003 (0.003)
Spread to reference gilt (bps) −0.004 (0.016) −0.003 (0.009)
Gilt amount outstanding (GBP mn) −0.00000 (0.00001) 0.00000 (0.00001)
Change in credit rating 2.729∗∗ (1.321) 2.657∗∗∗ (1.024)
Change in gilt amount outstanding (GBP mn) −0.0001 (0.0001) −0.00003 (0.00005)
Gilt QE purchases (GBP mn) 0.0001 (0.0001) 0.00000 (0.0001)
Control group Eligible Sterling
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 311 493
R2 0.065 0.073
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (6). The
variables and control groups are defined in Section 6.2. Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
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Table 61: Stock effects: Average trade size (GBP mn)
Average trade size (GBP mn)
(1) (2)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) 0.001 (0.007) −0.001 (0.005)
Amount outstanding (GBP mn) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.0004)
Credit rating −0.056 (0.091) −0.019 (0.070)
Residual maturity (years) 0.095 (0.086) 0.040 (0.046)
Residual maturity squared (years) −0.002 (0.002) −0.001 (0.001)
Spread to reference gilt (bps) 0.003 (0.004) 0.003 (0.002)
Gilt amount outstanding (GBP mn) −0.00000 (0.00000) 0.00000 (0.00000)
Change in credit rating −0.113 (0.345) −0.042 (0.203)
Change in gilt amount outstanding (GBP mn) −0.00003∗ (0.00001) −0.00001 (0.00001)
Gilt QE purchases (GBP mn) 0.0001∗∗∗ (0.00002) 0.00004∗∗ (0.00002)
Control group Eligible Sterling
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 183 279
R2 0.117 0.093
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (6). The
variables and control groups are defined in Section 6.2. Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
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Table 62: Stock effects: Number of block trades
Number of block trades
(1) (2)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) −0.005 (0.005) −0.009∗∗ (0.004)
Amount outstanding (GBP mn) 0.0001 (0.0005) 0.0001 (0.0003)
Credit rating −0.032 (0.062) 0.009 (0.048)
Residual maturity (years) 0.032 (0.054) 0.017 (0.033)
Residual maturity squared (years) −0.0002 (0.001) −0.0001 (0.001)
Spread to reference gilt (bps) 0.001 (0.002) −0.001 (0.001)
Gilt amount outstanding (GBP mn) −0.00000 (0.00000) 0.00000 (0.00000)
Change in credit rating 0.421∗∗ (0.208) 0.404∗∗ (0.162)
Change in gilt amount outstanding (GBP mn) −0.00002∗ (0.00001) −0.00000 (0.00001)
Gilt QE purchases (GBP mn) 0.00003∗ (0.00002) 0.00001 (0.00001)
Control group Eligible Sterling
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 311 493
R2 0.086 0.079
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (6). The
variables and control groups are defined in Section 6.2. Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
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Table 63: Stock effects: Effective spread (bps)
Effective spread (bps)
(1) (2)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) −0.011 (0.504) 0.386 (0.346)
Amount outstanding (GBP mn) 0.072∗ (0.039) 0.035 (0.028)
Credit rating −1.610 (5.970) −0.527 (3.960)
Residual maturity (years) 8.707∗ (5.124) 2.326 (2.802)
Residual maturity squared (years) −0.200∗∗ (0.095) −0.059 (0.042)
Spread to reference gilt (bps) 0.170 (0.208) 0.099 (0.112)
Gilt amount outstanding (GBP mn) 0.0003∗ (0.0002) 0.00005 (0.0001)
Change in credit rating 0.846∗∗∗ (19.241) 4.539 (11.089)
Change in gilt amount outstanding (GBP mn) −0.0001 (0.001) −0.0001 (0.001)
Gilt QE purchases (GBP mn) 0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.001)
Control group Eligible Sterling
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 41 83
R2 0.544 0.240
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (6). The
variables and control groups are defined in Section 6.2. Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
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Table 64: Stock effects: Roll (bps)
Roll (bps)
(1) (2)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) 0.134 (0.569) 0.075 (0.334)
Amount outstanding (GBP mn) 0.034 (0.039) 0.002 (0.026)
Credit rating 0.202 (5.600) −5.054 (4.292)
Residual maturity (years) −2.045 (7.929) 1.475 (3.202)
Residual maturity squared (years) 0.098 (0.150) 0.005 (0.047)
Spread to reference gilt (bps) 0.185 (0.220) −0.144 (0.138)
Gilt amount outstanding (GBP mn) 0.0001 (0.0003) 0.0002 (0.0001)
Change in credit rating 4.600 (25.731) 0.239 (12.197)
Change in gilt amount outstanding (GBP mn) 0.0003 (0.001) −0.0001 (0.001)
Gilt QE purchases (GBP mn) 0.003∗ (0.002) 0.002 (0.001)
Control group Eligible Sterling
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 57 88
R2 0.389 0.212
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (6). The
variables and control groups are defined in Section 6.2. Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
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Table 65: Stock effects: Round-trip cost (bps)
Round-trip cost (bps)
(1) (2)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) 1.126 −0.859 (1.187)
Amount outstanding (GBP mn) −0.169 0.184 (0.251)
Credit rating 34.460 −6.491 (12.365)
Residual maturity (years) 28.526 −21.683 (34.120)
Residual maturity squared (years) −0.597 0.340 (0.538)
Spread to reference gilt (bps) 1.424 −0.738 (0.554)
Gilt amount outstanding (GBP mn) 0.001 −0.001 (0.001)
Change in credit rating −4.149 (31.246)
Change in gilt amount outstanding (GBP mn) 0.002 (0.004)
Gilt QE purchases (GBP mn) 0.0004 (0.002)
Control group Eligible Sterling
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 9 18
R2 1.000 0.833
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (6). The
variables and control groups are defined in Section 6.2. Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
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Table 66: Stock effects: Interquartile range (bps)
Interquartile range (bps)
(1) (2)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) −0.117 (0.238) −0.121 (0.176)
Amount outstanding (GBP mn) −0.047∗∗ (0.020) −0.043∗∗ (0.017)
Credit rating −5.703∗∗ (2.783) −4.653∗ (2.528)
Residual maturity (years) 3.704 (2.817) 3.197∗ (1.719)
Residual maturity squared (years) −0.050 (0.054) −0.039 (0.027)
Spread to reference gilt (bps) −0.001 (0.108) −0.060 (0.082)
Gilt amount outstanding (GBP mn) 0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0001 (0.0001)
Change in credit rating 12.015 (11.840) 0.540 (7.632)
Change in gilt amount outstanding (GBP mn) 0.0002 (0.0005) −0.0001 (0.0004)
Gilt QE purchases (GBP mn) 0.0004 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
Control group Eligible Sterling
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 124 194
R2 0.247 0.117
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (6). The
variables and control groups are defined in Section 6.2. Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
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Table 67: Stock effects: Amihud (bps)
Amihud (bps)
(1) (2)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) −0.627 (0.805) −0.845 (0.543)
Amount outstanding (GBP mn) −0.030 (0.065) 0.014 (0.051)
Credit rating −1.643 (10.310) 10.732 (8.294)
Residual maturity (years) 10.782 (9.329) 6.067 (5.237)
Residual maturity squared (years) −0.069 (0.174) −0.045 (0.080)
Spread to reference gilt (bps) −0.193 (0.371) −0.083 (0.242)
Gilt amount outstanding (GBP mn) 0.0003 (0.0004) 0.0002 (0.0002)
Change in credit rating 16.812∗∗∗ (38.398) 0.999 (22.745)
Change in gilt amount outstanding (GBP mn) −0.001 (0.002) −0.001 (0.001)
Gilt QE purchases (GBP mn) 0.003 (0.003) 0.004∗ (0.002)
Control group Eligible Sterling
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 94 158
R2 0.247 0.138
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (6). The
variables and control groups are defined in Section 6.2. Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
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Table 68: Stock effects: Volatility-over-volume (bps)
Volatility-over-volume (bps)
(1) (2)
Amount purchased (GBP mn) −0.030 (0.343) 0.024 (0.207)
Amount outstanding (GBP mn) −0.013 (0.024) −0.008 (0.016)
Credit rating 4.757 (3.377) 3.212 (2.662)
Residual maturity (years) −1.047 (4.782) 0.363 (1.986)
Residual maturity squared (years) 0.034 (0.090) −0.003 (0.029)
Spread to reference gilt (bps) 0.117 (0.132) 0.103 (0.086)
Gilt amount outstanding (GBP mn) 0.00003 (0.0002) 0.0001 (0.0001)
Change in credit rating −2.839 (15.518) −5.434 (7.566)
Change in gilt amount outstanding (GBP mn) 0.0002 (0.001) −0.00001 (0.0004)
Gilt QE purchases (GBP mn) 0.0002 (0.001) 0.0004 (0.001)
Control group Eligible Sterling
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 57 88
R2 0.200 0.142
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table shows estimated regression results for equation (6). The
variables and control groups are defined in Section 6.2. Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
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